Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, by Patrick Porter

Kitchen, James E.

doi:10.1093/ehr/cer136

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Drawing on Edward Said's work on Orientalism (Said 1978), Patrick Porter defines 'military orientalism' as 'Westerner […] representations about the Orient at war' (Porter 2009, 23). These bellicose imaginaries concretize in an exotic and simplistic portrait of the 'oriental enemy', its ideal type being archaic, irrationally violent, religiously mystic and fanatic (Porter 2009;Barkawi and Stanski 2012). In the same way, Kyle draws a simple and orientalist portrait of enemies.…”

Section: Weapons and Techno-military Details: Violence As Techno-feti...mentioning

confidence: 96%

Normalizing violence through front-line stories: the case ofAmerican Sniper

Pomarède

2016

Critical Military Studies

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The objective of the present article is to explore the image of the 'war on terror' in US popular culture through soldiers' battlefield experience. The main argument is that the 'living' (or 'embarked') narration of front lines creates an effect of power that gives the soldier a legitimate authority to take part in the representation of war. As such, the 'view from the battlefield' can be conceptualized as a political gesture as it involves the production of shared representations of war. The article focuses on the American Sniper legend, which is a heroic narration of the experience in Iraq of a former Navy SEAL, Chris Kyle. I propose to understand the conditions that made possible the collective normalization of a soldier considered 'the most lethal sniper in the US military history'. The study of this case brings to the fore two main conclusions. First, the political dimension of American Sniper paradoxically emerges from an apolitical discourse that claims to tell the 'real story' of a soldier on front lines. Second, war appears at the same time as an agonistic struggle for life where killing is the condition for survival and as a banal and trans-historical reality embodied into 'ordinary' human emotions.

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Section: Weapons and Techno-military Details: Violence As Techno-feti...mentioning

confidence: 96%

Normalizing violence through front-line stories: the case ofAmerican Sniper

Pomarède

2016

Critical Military Studies

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“…An added complication in more recent campaigns is the manner in which host nation governments have sought to liaise with foreign militaries fighting a counterinsurgency campaign on their behalf (Cowper-Cowles 2012). Finally, what can be described euphemistically as "a cultural dissonance" often manifests itself in wars between Western and non-Western societies and the armed groups representing them (Porter 2013).…”

Section: Counterinsurgency and The War On Terrormentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterinsurgency Reconsidered

Chin

2024

ReO

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“…For those small powers operating in the shadow of the United States, one may hear the cynical and exculpatory claim that the only reason they joined in was "alliance solidarity," implying that they never had any intent to achieve anything serious for the Afghans (Berdal & Suhrke, 2018). A few will assert, with odd, determinist logic, that as the Afghans have always defeated Western invaders, they would also overcome the present lot (Jones, 2010;Porter, 2009). Others will pin the blame on external factors, notably the duplicitous role of Pakistan (Coll, 2018;Whitlock, 2021).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…The blame may even be put squarely on our Afghan allies: Their criminal corruption doomed any chance of building popular support and creating an effective state that could establish a monopoly of violence (Fairweather, 2014;O'Hanlon & Sherjan, 2010). Some may say, finally, with more than a whiff of orientalist bias, that "Afghan culture" was irredeemable (Porter, 2009). An overall conclusion may be reached that the war was "unwinnable" (Farrell, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan, 2001–2021

Honig

Käihkö

2022

Armed Forces & Society

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The Western defeat in Afghanistan was due to an inadequate process of strategic reflection informed, first, by an overestimation of the attractiveness of the Western political agenda to Afghans and, second, by overconfidence in the effectiveness of its military approach. As a corollary, popular support for the Taliban was underestimated. The insurgents possessed a degree of what we term strategic cohesion—a sociopolitical and military embeddedness within society—that produced a far stronger strategic effectiveness than we could replicate in our Afghan allies. Furthermore, a military-professional mindset underestimated the degree to which political considerations permeated the battlefield. The political effect of military actions was insufficiently integrated into strategic practice. Specifically, the linchpin officer in staff planning and field operations in Western armies struggled to act as what we term strategic colonels. In both respects, the war continues to offer important lessons for Western involvement in future conflict, including with Russia and China.

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Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, by Patrick Porter

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Normalizing violence through front-line stories: the case ofAmerican Sniper

Normalizing violence through front-line stories: the case ofAmerican Sniper

Counterinsurgency Reconsidered

An Exemplary Defeat: The West in Afghanistan, 2001–2021

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