Military Operations and the Notion of Control Under International Law

Meaningful Human Control (MHC) has been a consistent key term in legal debates concerning autonomous weapon systems (AWS), but its usefulness as a policy or lawmaking tool is limited due to a lack of clarity on what the concept encompasses. This study engaged in a thorough literature study of official statements, policy papers and academic papers published between 2013–2021 to determine features common to these proposals and synthesise a workable framework of MHC. The framework identifies five core elements—awareness, weaponeering, context control, prediction and accountability—and many interlocking mechanisms which link these elements together in a causal and chronological manner corresponding to the military targeting process. Subsequently, a detailed commentary and discussion is provided on the individual differences between sources, how specific elements can be implemented in practice by military commanders, and particularly controversial points are highlighted which require specific consideration by commentators and policymakers. The framework identifies concrete and practicable ways commanders can exercise control over AWS and serves as a solid foundation for further legal analysis of commanders’ duties when employing AWS, for future policy discussions, and as a problem-solving tool to resolve important legal questions such as the ubiquitous ‘accountability gap’ conundrum.

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Mitigating the Risk of Autonomous Weapon Misuse by Insurgent Groups

Kwik

2022

Laws

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The intersection between autonomous weapon systems (‘AWS’) and non-state armed groups (‘NSAG’) is an underexplored aspect of the AWS debate, but one which is nevertheless important: insurgencies have proliferated globally, and armed groups are often associated with a number of violations of the laws of armed conflict (‘LOAC’). This article explores the main ways future policymakers can reduce the risk of NSAGs committing violations using AWS once the technology becomes more prolific and easily distributable. It does this by sketching a chronological picture of an NSAG’s weapons obtention process, looking first at its likely suppliers and transport routes (acquisition), and, subsequently, at factors which can increase the risk of LOAC violations once the system is in their possession (use). With regard to use, we find that the lack of explicit legal obligations in LOAC to (a) review weapons meant solely for transfer and (b) provide technical training to recipients of transfer constitute serious reasons why LOAC violations may be aggravated with the introduction of AWS to insurgent groups. We also find, however, that states are uniquely and powerfully placed to address both acquisition and use factors, and can, in certain situations, be persuaded into implementing risk-reducing measures such as technical training purely for strategic reasons.

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Military Operations and the Notion of Control Under International Law

Cited by 3 publications

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The Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations: An Ambitious Sui Generis Expert Panel Manual with Time on Its Side?

The Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations: An Ambitious Sui Generis Expert Panel Manual with Time on Its Side?

A Practicable Operationalisation of Meaningful Human Control

Mitigating the Risk of Autonomous Weapon Misuse by Insurgent Groups

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