Military doctrine and intelligence fusion in the American homeland

Hidek, Matt

doi:10.1080/17539153.2011.586207

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(28 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Dentro de esa corriente se incardina el llamado isomorfismo institucional, teoría que sostiene que las organizaciones adoptan las estructuras o modelos de otras instituciones ya existentes, bien como una forma de obtener legitimidad, bien tratando de replicar el logro de los resultados buscados por las primeras. Se ha observado el recurso a este marco teórico para el estudio de las fuerzas armadas a nivel global (Farrell 1998), la integración de la doctrina militar en otras iniciativas de seguridad (Hidek 2011), o en inteligencia policial y servicios de inteligencia (Carter 2016;Cremades 2021).…”

Section: Marco Teóricounclassified

El desarrollo de la política de cultura de inteligencia en España: un caso de isomorfismo institucional

Cremades

Bueno

2022

Urvio

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Desde su creación en 2003, la política de cultura de inteligencia ha tenido como propósito la sensibilización social acerca de la labor y necesidad del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI). Esta política ha servido como marco de diferentes acciones dirigidas a favorecer una mayor interlocución del servicio de inteligencia español con la sociedad civil, con la política pública de fomento de la cultura de defensa como precedente más cercano e inmediato. El presente artículo traza las similitudes en el desarrollo de ambas políticas públicas, a partir de la consulta de fuentes primarias y secundarias de acceso público, y las analiza a través del concepto de isomorfismo institucional. Como conclusión principal, se señala que la política de cultura de inteligencia es producto de un proceso de emulación de las prácticas de instituciones que comparten un mismo campo organizacional, como las que entonces se desarrollaban en el ámbito de la defensa. Abstract Since its creation in 2003, the purpose of the intelligence culture policy has been to raise social awareness about the work and the need for the National Intelligence Centre (CNI). This policy has served as a framework for different actions aimed at promoting greater dialogue between the Spanish intelligence service and civil society, with the policy of promoting the culture of defense as the closest and immediate precedent. This article traces the similarities in the development of both public policies throughout the consultation of primary and secondary sources of public access and also analyzes them through the concept of institutional isomorphism. As the main conclusion, the political culture of intelligence is pointed out as a product of a process of emulation of the practices of institutions that share the same organizational field, as those that were already developed in the field of defense.

show abstract

Section: Marco Teóricounclassified

El desarrollo de la política de cultura de inteligencia en España: un caso de isomorfismo institucional

Cremades

Bueno

2022

Urvio

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…From the available information-including DHS reports, congressional testimony and reports, GAO reports, CRS reports, and our own interviews, it is difficult to determine lines of authority, force of regulations and guidelines, funding streams and effectiveness of funding, and oversight that currently exist for fusion centers. Problems with transparency will likely be aggravated by the presence of private-sector analysts at fusion center sites and the growth of public-private partnerships and security contracting more broadly, in part because private entities are not subject to the same expectations for public transparency (Hidek 2011). Additionally, when fusion centers can evade open-records requests, whether through exemptions provided by state law, such as is the case in Virginia (German and Stanley 2008), or through claims of possessing no ''material project,'' as has happened with the fusion center in New Mexico (Hylton 2009), transparency and accountability are further attenuated.…”

Section: Formal or Informal Oversight Bodiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fusion Center Accountability and Intergovernmental Information Sharing

Regan

Monahan

2014

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Following the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the states cooperated in the establishment of fusion centers to facilitate sharing of data across government agencies, as well as across the public and private sectors. Based on interviews with officials in thirty-six different fusion centers and review of government documents and reports on fusion centers' activities, this article analyzes the interjurisdictional, regulatory, and legal accountability arrangements for these centers. Our findings indicate that fusion centers operate in a manner consistent with ''opportunistic federalism'' or ''soft governance.'' Accountability in such a setting is particularly difficult but especially in the absence of shared professional goals as appears to be the case for fusion centers. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, has supported the creation of ''fusion centers'' with a mandate to share data across government agencies as well as across the public and private sectors. The stated goal of fusion centers is to ''blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis and coordinate security measures to reduce threats in their communities'' (U.S. DHS 2006). Concerns about privacy and surveillance, as well as about effectiveness and accountability, have surfaced in response to these centers. As of August 2013, there were seventy-eight DHS primary and recognized 1 state and local fusion centers. Some of these were created in response to terrorism concerns, whereas others emerged from existing law enforcement organizations, such as drug interdiction, crime control, or regional coordination. This article analyzes the interjurisdictional, regulatory, and legal accountability arrangements for these centers. With their goals of information sharing, ''connecting the dots,'' and moving beyond traditional information silos, fusion centers operate across a variety of jurisdictional boundaries, which often exist in different regulatory and legal environments. It is generally challenging to design and manage accountability in such multijurisdictional and multipurpose settings. A lack of clarity about the organizational position, and hence the accountability, of

show abstract

Anchor Institutions as Adaptation Allies: promises and pitfalls of joint urban/military adaptation planning in U.S. cities

Teicher

2023

Geoforum

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Military doctrine and intelligence fusion in the American homeland

Cited by 5 publications

References 41 publications

El desarrollo de la política de cultura de inteligencia en España: un caso de isomorfismo institucional

El desarrollo de la política de cultura de inteligencia en España: un caso de isomorfismo institucional

Fusion Center Accountability and Intergovernmental Information Sharing

Anchor Institutions as Adaptation Allies: promises and pitfalls of joint urban/military adaptation planning in U.S. cities

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About