2016
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195626
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
6
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
2

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 21 publications
(6 citation statements)
references
References 0 publications
0
6
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Considerable work has examined the causal mechanisms that lead militaries to harm civilians. 6 These explanations tend to focus on international, national, or organizational-level factors, such as identity-based antagonism, the regime type that the military represents, the expected strategic costs and benefits on the battlefield, domestic and global pressures, military culture, command enforcement, group ideology, and group socialization and induction rituals (Arreguín-Toft, 2001; Bell, 2016; Cohen, 2013; DeMeritt, 2012; Downes, 2008; Kahl, 2007; Manekin, 2020; Ruffa, 2018; Stanton, 2016; Valentino, 2004, 2014). 7 The fast-paced and relatively decentralized nature of modern warfare, however, means that individual commanders and combatants frequently have considerable latitude in choosing how and when to deploy violence on the battlefield.…”
Section: Partisanship and Adoption Of Norms Of Restraintmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Considerable work has examined the causal mechanisms that lead militaries to harm civilians. 6 These explanations tend to focus on international, national, or organizational-level factors, such as identity-based antagonism, the regime type that the military represents, the expected strategic costs and benefits on the battlefield, domestic and global pressures, military culture, command enforcement, group ideology, and group socialization and induction rituals (Arreguín-Toft, 2001; Bell, 2016; Cohen, 2013; DeMeritt, 2012; Downes, 2008; Kahl, 2007; Manekin, 2020; Ruffa, 2018; Stanton, 2016; Valentino, 2004, 2014). 7 The fast-paced and relatively decentralized nature of modern warfare, however, means that individual commanders and combatants frequently have considerable latitude in choosing how and when to deploy violence on the battlefield.…”
Section: Partisanship and Adoption Of Norms Of Restraintmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Constructivist IR scholars argue that military culture – the ‘basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings’ of military organizations – influences armed group behavior by, in part, ordering members’ preferences regarding force (Kier, 1997: 28; Farrell, 2001; Legro, 1995). As a result, military culture studies find that organizational cultures embodying norms of restraint can limit violence against civilians in wartime (Kahl, 2007; Bell, 2016; Ruffa, 2018).…”
Section: Existing Theories Of Violence and Restraint In Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 Normative training and education (often occurring in classrooms or other formal training environments) primarily transmit the content of organizational norms, while other socialization mechanisms – occurring often outside of classrooms – reinforce the importance of norms to members. Horizontal, informal
Figure 1. The combatant’s trilemma
socialization can also occur within organizations, as part of interactive training discussions and peer-based small groups, or outside official organizational socialization processes, such as within subunits (Bell, 2016; Wood & Toppelberg, 2017; Van Maanen, 1978). These pathways, either singularly or in combination, shape target actors’ normative preferences (see e.g.…”
Section: Socialization and Combatant Preferencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Branch 2005)-as a symbol of national unity. Military socialization and political education programmes, both within the military and for civilians, helped ensure integrees' and their constituencies' loyalty to the state, built commanders' trust in them, and also created systems of monitoring within the armed forces and in communities (Bell 2016;Kabwegyere 2000;Lewis 2012Lewis , 2020.…”
Section: Ugandamentioning
confidence: 99%