Midfrontal theta as an index of conflict strength in approach–approach vs avoidance–avoidance conflicts

Abstract

The seminal theory of motivational conflicts distinguishes between Approach-Approach conflicts, in which a decision is made between desirable alternatives, and Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts, in which a decision is made between undesirable alternatives. The behavioral differences between Approach-Approach and Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts are well documented: both Lewin’s and Miller’s original conceptualization, as well as abundant empirical research that followed, showed that Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts are more difficult to resolve than Approach-Approach ones. However, there is little to no research looking into the neural underpinnings of the differences between the two conflict types. Here, we show that midfrontal theta, an established neural marker of conflict, distinguished between the two conflict types such that midfrontal theta power was higher in Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts than in Approach-Approach conflicts. We further demonstrate that higher midfrontal theta power was associated with shorter decision times on a single trial basis, indicating that midfrontal theta played a role in promoting successful controlled behavior. Taken together, our results show that Approach-Approach and Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts are distinguishable on the neural level. The implications of these results go beyond motivational conflicts, as they establish midfrontal theta as a measure of continuous degree of conflict in subjective decisions.

Hand movement trajectories illustrate the mechanism underlying Kurt Lewin’s distinction between approach–approach and avoidance–avoidance motivational conflicts.

“…In Study 1, we first replicated findings from previous research (Atthowe, 1960;Barker, 1942;Boyd et al, 2011;Enisman & Kleiman, 2024;Epstein & Smith, 1967;Heitmann & Deutsch, 2019;Houston et al, 1991;Levy et al, 2023;Minor et al, 1968;Murray, 1975;Ringuette, 1965;Schill, 1966;Terry, 2010), showing that AV-AV conflicts take longer to resolve than AP-AP conflicts. We additionally showed that AP-AP and AV-AV conflicts were distinguishable using mouse-tracking measures of conflict-strength (AUC and MD).…”

“…We did not test the measures' reliability but relied on vast previous literature (Arkoff, 1957;Atthowe, 1960;Barker, 1946;Boyd et al, 2011;Chernev, 2004;Dhar & Sherman, 1996;Enisman & Kleiman, 2024;Epstein & Smith, 1967;Heitmann & Deutsch, 2019;Houston et al, 1991;Hovland & Sears, 1938;Levy et al, 2023;Minor et al, 1968;Murray, 1975;Ringuette, 1965;Schill, 1966;Smith & Gehl, 1974;Terry, 2010). If covariates are used, have the researchers ensured they are not affected by the experimental manipulation before including them in comparisons across experimental groups?…”

“…In the 90 years since the inception of the force-fields theory, virtually all the research pertaining to the differences between AV–AV and AP–AP conflicts has examined solely the outcome . Specifically, research has repeatedly and robustly demonstrated that AV–AV conflicts take longer to resolve than AP–AP ones and that they are subjectively experienced as being more difficult to resolve (Arkoff, 1957; Atthowe, 1960; Barker, 1946; Boyd et al, 2011; Chernev, 2004; Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Enisman & Kleiman, 2024; Epstein & Smith, 1967; Heitmann & Deutsch, 2019; Houston et al, 1991; Hovland & Sears, 1938; Levy et al, 2023; Minor et al, 1968; Murray, 1975; Ringuette, 1965; Schill, 1966; Smith & Gehl, 1974; Terry, 2010). However, to date, the force-fields mechanism that Lewin (1931) and Miller (1944) suggested to differentiate between AV–AV and AP–AP conflicts has never been empirically tested, not even by Lewin and Miller themselves (for anecdotal, descriptive data see Barker, 1942; Klebanoff, 1939, as cited in Miller, 1944).…”

“…Indeed, virtually any area in Social Psychology investigated the differences between positives and negatives (see Baumeister et al, 2001, for an across-domain review). Finally, it is surprising that the proposed mechanism underlying AP–AP versus AV–AV conflicts was not previously tested, given that the motivational conflicts theory did instigate extensive research examining the differences in outcome between the two types of conflict (Arkoff, 1957; Atthowe, 1960; Barker, 1946; Boyd et al, 2011; Chernev, 2004; Dhar & Sherman, 1996; Enisman & Kleiman, 2024; Epstein & Smith, 1967; Heitmann & Deutsch, 2019; Houston et al, 1991; Hovland & Sears, 1938; Levy et al, 2023; Minor et al, 1968; Murray, 1975; Ringuette, 1965; Schill, 1966; Smith & Gehl, 1974; Terry, 2010).…”

“…On the other hand, several reasons might have prevented previous research from testing the mechanism specified by the seminal motivational conflicts theory and, consequently, its boundary conditions. First, given the robust and large effect sizes of the behavioral differences between AP–AP and AV–AV conflicts (e.g., Boyd et al, 2011; Enisman & Kleiman, 2024; Heitmann & Deutsch, 2019; Levy et al, 2023; Terry, 2010), previous research might have taken the theoretical mechanistic basis somewhat for granted, and did not feel a pressing need to test the mechanism. The large main effect might have also made researchers skeptical as to the possibility for altering (reducing) it through subtle context effects.…”