Microenterprises and multiple bank relationships: The case of professionals

Räthke-Döppner

2014

Small Bus Econ

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractTo sustain growth in an aging economy, it is important to ease the financing of small firms by bank loans. Using bank internal data of small business loans in Germany, we examine the determinants of loan rates in the period 1995-2010. Beyond characteristics of the firm, the loan contract, and the lending relationship, demographic aspects matter. However, collateral and relationship lending play a larger role in loan pricing than the entrepreneur's age. Banks do not seem to discriminate older borrowers by higher loan rates. We rather find statistical discrimination of younger borrowers because of their lower wealth. Single entrepreneurs obtain cheaper loans than married ones. Firms in peripheral regions with low population density are disadvantaged by higher loan rates compared to those in agglomerated regions.JEL classification: D14, E43, G21, J14, L26

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of demographics in small business loan pricing

Räthke-Döppner

2014

Small Bus Econ

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“…If, however, the production loans to households are interpreted as loans to unincorporated firms, the borrowing purpose may be relevant to explain the low incidence of collateral. Since in the case of selfemployed persons, personal assets can be used for business as well as private purposes, the distinction between inside and outside collateral may not be useful here (Neuberger and Räthke, 2009). In fact, personal assets of small business owners are often pledged as collateral.…”

Section: Theoretical Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Collateral and its substitutes in emerging markets’ lending

Menkhoff

Journal of Banking & Finance

Rungruxsirivorn

2012

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112

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Collateral and its Substitutes in Emerging Markets' Lending Abstract Due to opaque information and weak enforcement in emerging loan markets, the need for collateral is high, whereas borrowers lack adequate assets to pledge as collateral. How is this puzzle solved? We find for a representative sample from Northeast Thailand that indeed most loans do not include any tangible assets as collateral. Instead, lenders enforce collateral-free loans through third-party guarantees and relationship lending, but also through modifying loan terms, such as reducing loan size. Guarantees are the relatively most important substitute, they reduce collateral requirements independently of relationship lending and they are more often used by formal financial institutions. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: G210, O160.

“…Especially in the case of micro and small enterprises, a single person, usually the ownermanager, has to possess both technical and managerial skills (Neuberger/Räthke 2008).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial constraints of ethnic entrepreneurship: evidence from Germany

Bruder

International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior &Amp; Research

Räthke-Döppner

2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This is the first attempt to test hypotheses about financial constraints of ethnic minority owned businesses in Germany. Using data from a survey among 3,000 ethnic and native entrepreneurs, we examine differences in the financing patterns between both demographic groups. We find that entrepreneurs with a migration background are more likely to be denied credit or to obtain smaller loan amounts than requested. After controlling for observed risk factors and financial relationships as explanatory variables, ethnicity plays no role in explaining differences in the probability of credit rationing. These can be rather explained by the firm's location and characteristics of the bank-customer relationship. Thus, we find no evidence for prejudicial discrimination in the loan market. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Code: G21, G32