Microeconomics-based resource allocation in overlay networks by using non-strategic behavior modeling

Strategic behavior modeling of multi-service overlay multicast networks based on auction mechanism design

“…Our proposed algorithms are asynchronous in the sense that the durations of the slots are not the same. In fact, much of the literature does so as well [21,6,19,2,3]. The asynchronicity of the events lies in this fact that due to dynamic nature of the overlay network, every peer may join/leave to/from the network at any arbitrary moment.…”

“…Analoui and Rezvani [1][2][3] are the first to apply microeconomics-inspired models in the overlay multicast networks. They have presented a non-strategic behavior model by leveraging the concept of ''Walrasian general equilibrium''.…”

“…There have recently been a significant body of research towards designing self-organizing overlay multicast networks by exploiting the inherent selfishness of the peers. These research works can be categorized into two significant strands: ''strategic behavior modeling approach'' [14,21,13,16,22,11,18] and ''non-strategic behavior modeling approach'' [6,19,[1][2][3]. In the former, each peer is treated as a potential game player who seeks to maximize the utility regard to the actions that the other peers do, whereas in the latter each peer seeks to maximize its utility without taking into account the actions of the other peers.…”

A scheme of resource allocation and stability for peer–to–peer file–sharing networks

“…This approach takes into account economic issues when managing limited resources in P2P networks, and assesses the sustainability of the economic model by means of the pricing policy (Li and Liao, 2014;Li and Sun, 2016). For example, Analoui and Rezvani (2011) applied the theory of consumer-firm developed in microeconomics to resource allocation in overlay networks and proposed distributed algorithms for peers' "joining" and "leaving" operations. Kumar et al (2011) designed a mechanism for pricing and resource allocation in P2P networks that allows users in a firm to effectively share computing resources.…”

“…Generally, pricing mechanisms mainly concentrate on motivating users to share resource with others and not declining other users' requests by relating their behaviors to a financial utility or mechanism. Several interesting pricing approaches have been presented for P2Ps in recent years, for example, the lottery-based scheme (Zghaibeh and Harmantzis, 2008), the Lagrangian multiplier method (Eger and Killat, 2007;Koutsopoulos and Iosifidis, 2010;Neely and Golubchik, 2011), the microeconomics-based approach (Kumar et al, 2011;Analoui and Rezvani, 2011), auction-based mechanisms Zuo and Zhang, 2013), and game-based ones (Park and Van Der Schaar, 2010;Nakano and Okaie, 2010;Okaie and Nakano, 2012;Kang and Wu, 2015;Lin et al, 2015). In this paper we propose a pricing scheme to achieve reasonable resource allocation in P2P file-sharing networks.…”