“…As amino-acid overproduction incurred significant fitness costs (Figure 2b), genotypes that take advantage of the released 'public good' without reciprocating are selectively favoured and thus expected to exploit the resource until the ecological interaction collapses (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981;Bull and Rice, 1991;Sachs et al, 2004). Nevertheless, obligate mutualisms are widespread in nature among both micro- (Schink, 2002;Morris et al, 2013) and macroorganisms (Boucher, 1988;Douglas, 1994) and, in some of these cases, noncooperating types have been described to coexist with mutualists for extended evolutionary periods (Sachs and Simms, 2006). It is generally believed that either derived 'partner choice' mechanisms such as the punishment of non-cooperating individuals (Bull and Rice, 1991;Yu, 2001) or spatially structured environments (Doebeli and Knowlton, 1998;Wilson et al, 2003) are required to protect mutually beneficial interactions from being exploited by non-cooperators.…”