Michael Hand, Indoctrination and the Inculcation of Belief

Abstract

In ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered’ Michael Hand revisits the debate on the right of parents to give their children a religious upbringing in a liberal context. According to him, the logical difficulty lies in the fact that parents cannot both impart religious beliefs and avoid indoctrination. While Peter Gardner and Jim Mackenzie have responded to Hand's paper and raised a number of pertinent issues, what is missing is a fuller treatment of indoctrination and belief inculcation for children. In this paper, I argue that Hand's fallacy lies in his flawed understanding of indoctrination and belief inculcation: the inculcation of non‐rational beliefs, far from being indoctrinatory, is in fact necessary for children in the process of growing up.

Learning-centred parental engagement: Freire reimagined

“…One might argue that this banking model of learning never takes place except perhaps in clear instances of indoctrination (Merry, 2005;Snook, 1972;Tan, 2004). Whether or not this banking model actually describes the process that occurs, however, is not really the point Freire is making.…”

Rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives

“…A proper understanding of rationality and autonomy should therefore be situated within the context of an ideological framework -a point that is glossed over in the Enlightenment paradigm. Comprising a substantive set of practices, beliefs and values, an ideological framework offers the 'developmental structure' -a well-defined domestic space for the child before he or she can begin to question (Puolimatka 1996(Puolimatka , 1997Tan 2004). Given that a rational discussion of any issue assumes acceptance, at least for the duration of the discussion, of some framework of beliefs in virtue of which truth assessments can be made, the elimination of such frameworks from discussions 'not only cannot ensure autonomous rational assessments of the issues involved, but it actually renders such assessments impossible' (Laura and Leahy 1989, 263).…”

My Two 'Difficulties'

“…The issue is not a matter of the nature of beliefs themselves—of whether there are sufficient evidence to establish these beliefs—but of the nature of children who have yet to possess full rational autonomy. I have argued in my paper that a primary culture is essential for rational deliberation to take place as the child needs ‘a well‐defined domestic space before she can begin to question, for without this children will become insecure with a feeling of powerlessness in a meaningless universe’ (Tan, 2004, pp. 262–263).…”

“…What I did write and argue for is the view that there are certain beliefs that need to be imparted to children for their well‐being. In my paper, I describe these beliefs variously as ‘fundamental propositions which make up the rational system of beliefs and that determine what is understood at a particular time by such an idea as the “rational” or “reasonable” man’ (Tan, 2004, p. 261), propositions that ‘constitute the foundation for rational discourse to take place’ ( ibid . ), ‘a substantive set of practices, beliefs and values’ (p. 262), ‘a stable framework of reference or a set of standards to guide them in regard to important decisions that have to be made as they grow towards maturity’ ( ibid .)…”