Mexican electoral law: 1996 version

Abstract

The Mexican electoral law of 1996, though less anfractuous than its predecessors, is again inconsistent: it may well be impossible to satisfy its clauses. The basic intents of the pertinent clauses of the Constitution may be met, and the inconsistencies of the law eliminated, by using a 'bi-proportional' method of apportionment. This would not, however, change the overall political outcome: one relatively large party in the presence of several relatively smaller ones would continue to obtain a comfortable and absolute majority. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Keywords: electoral systems, apportionment, proportional representation, bi-proportional representation Introducti onIn 1996, the Mexican electoral law was changed again, and so too the several cognate articles of Mexico's Constitution. Happily, the particulars of the numerical 'rules' for transforming votes into seats are clearer and more direct than ever before, though better rules could have been used. But once again, the law is inconsistent and contradicts the requirements that are promulgated in the Constitution.The aim of this short article is first, to explain the electoral rules and point out where the inconsistencies arise and why the Constitution is violated; and second, to propose an alternative system that responds to what it seems was intended in simple and clear terms, with a rule that is sure to give consistent results.There has been a lot of optimistic talk about democratic liberalization in Mexico, elections that are fairer, counts that are more accurate, and the like. But something more is needed: an electoral law that is unambiguous and fair, whose arithmetic does not distort the awards in seats beyond what is earned in votes. Otherwise, the gains in the tallying of votes will be lost in the transformation of the votes into seats. We show that a clear, consistent and simple formulation can meet the seeming intentions of the revised system; nonetheless the basic frame-*Author for correspondence. 330Mexican Electoral Law: 1996 Version work of the current and past laws gives an almost insurmountable advantage to one big party in the presence of several lesser ones.

Network flow methods for electoral systems

“…The fact that the problem is not trivial is witnessed by the presence in the electoral law of some countries of unsound and self‐contradictory procedures for solving BAP. For example, Balinski and Ramírez [8] discovered that the Mexican electoral law was not correct, with the result that the procedure was modified. However, in other countries — like Italy —‐ this problem still persists.…”

Certificates of optimality for minimum norm biproportional apportionments

“…Indeed, naive and 'easy to understand' procedures may generate inconsistencies and anomalies [3,[10][11][12][13]. On the other hand transparency of the electoral machinery is a fundamental property because not only the citizens should be able to easily check the correctness of the seat assignments (Principle 1 in the so-called "Erice Decalogue" [19]) but also the electoral authority in first place.…”

Parametric maximum flow methods for minimax approximation of target quotas in biproportional apportionment

“…The electoral law of some countries includes unsound and self‐contradictory procedures for solving BAP. Balinski and Ramırez [7] discovered a bug in the Mexican electoral law. After a while, the law was changed.…”

“…This software was successfully used in the 2006 elections of the Zurich Canton (Pukelsheim [26]) and more recently (2009) in those of the Aargau and the Schaffhausen Cantons. Several authors have advocated the use of sound biproportional apportionment algorithms to distribute seats to parties within districts in countries such as Mexico (Balinski and Ramırez [7]), France (Balinski [2]), Switzerland (Pukelsheim and Schuhmacher [27], Pukelsheim [26], Balinski and Pukelsheim [5, 6]), Italy (Pennisi et al [23]), Spain (Ramırez et al [29]), Faroe Islands (Zachariasen [33]). Balinski ([2] p. 215) discusses also the application of such algorithms to the election of French representatives in the European Parliament.…”