Methodological behaviorism from the standpoint of a radical behaviorist

Abstract

Methodological behaviorism is the name for a prescriptive orientation to psychological science. Its first and original feature is that the terms and concepts deployed in psychological theories and explanations should be based on observable stimuli and behavior. I argue that the interpretation of the phrase "based on" has changed over the years because of the influence of operationism. Its second feature, which developed after the first and is prominent in contemporary psychology, is that research should emphasize formal testing of a theory that involves mediating theoretical entities from an nonbehavioral dimension according to the hypothetico-deductive method. I argue that for contemporary methodological behaviorism, explanations of the behavior of both participants and scientists appeal to the mediating entities as mental causes, if only indirectly. In contrast to methodological behaviorism is the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner. Unlike methodological behaviorism, radical behaviorism conceives of verbal behavior in terms of an operant process that involves antecedent circumstances and reinforcing consequences, rather than in terms of a nonbehavioral process that involves reference and symbolism. In addition, radical behaviorism recognizes private behavioral events and subscribes to research and explanatory practices that do not include testing hypotheses about supposed mediating entities from another dimension. I conclude that methodological behaviorism is actually closer to mentalism than to Skinner's radical behaviorism.

Still some explaining to do: A review of The Escape of the Mind by Howard Rachlin

“…Rather than deny mind, mental states, intentions, purposes, etc. or exclude them from scientific analysis, Rachlin identifies those terms with the behavioral patterns that define them (c.f., McDowell, and Moore, ). In this way, teleological behaviorism is a behavioral identity theory.…”

“…In what follows, I summarize the book's chapters and try to abstract an accurate description of Rachlin's teleological behaviorism before offering a critique. Because I have little to add to the several already published responses to Rachlin's (and Baum's, , they are similar but not identical) position on private events (Catania, ; Dougher, ; Leigland, ; Marr, , ; Moore, ; Palmer, ; Schlinger, ) and Rachlin's article () on whether a computer could be made human (McDowell, ; Schlinger, ), my critique will focus on the book itself and what I perceive to be its strengths and limitations.…”

About teleological behaviorism

“…There is nothing indirect about those observations (cf. Moore, 2013). Thus, TB not only is unlike methodological behaviorism, it is just about as unlike methodological behaviorism as it can be.…”

Is talking to yourself thinking?

“…It has two basic principles: It excludes mental causes from a science of behavior. RB rejects what Day () and Moore () call “mentalism.” This is the notion that mental states mediate between the environment and behavior. Day says (p. 90): “…mentalism can…be defined as the practice of taking mental and psychological states to be the causes of behavior.” This practice is strongly rejected by RB. It attempts to explain the sorts of behavior attributed, in everyday life, to mental causes, in terms of private behavior occurring inside of the organism.…”

“…But before discussing how TEB sees private events let us consider why the study of private events was deemed by RB to be necessary in a modern science of behavior in the first place. Consider the following passage from Skinner () as quoted by Moore ():

When we say that behavior is a function of the environment, the term “environment” presumably means any event in the universe affecting the organism. But part of the universe is enclosed within the organism's own skin.

…”