Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671

Pasnau, Robert

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567911.001.0001

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“…99 Pasnau considers this passage as convincing proof of Newton's adhesion to holenmerianism: in his view, Newton intended to affirm that the whole of God's simple substance could be simultaneously present in every place in the same manner as a moment of time was present everywhere, i.e., without having divisible parts. 100 Reid is more cautious: he refers to another passage in the 1713 General Scholium, where Newton was substantial. Locke's interest in this work is attested by his correspondence and manuscript notes; some of these notes concerned the Kabbalistic doctrines of the preexistence and transmigration of souls.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Locke and Holenmerism

Biase

2019

LockeStud

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Locke's conception of God's manner of being present everywhere is unclear. He seemed to agree with the Cambridge Platonist Henry More that spirits were present in space not merely operationally-a position which More labelled "nullibism"-but substantially; however, it is not clear whether he endorsed More's view of God as an infinitely extended being, filling space with His amplitude of presence or rather the alternative, scholastic conception, which may be called "holenmerianism" (from More's "holenmerian") and which affirmed that God was substantially present everywhere as a whole in the whole and a whole in each part. The paper attempts to explore this question in detail by focusing on an episode in Locke's later correspondence, which suggested that he was not committed to holenmerianism. The episode focused on the dispute which Locke had entered into with Johannes Hudde in 1697 on how to prove God's uniqueness; the "physical" proof he provided to settle the dispute did not rely on a holenmerian conception of God's presence in space. Locke's proof was based on a principle he had established in the Essay, which determined the impenetrability of spirits by other spirits; the paper shows that, although More did not accept this principle, he might have agreed with Locke's proof. Finally, the paper suggests that further evidence coming from the Essay, taking into account Locke's reading of Newton's De gravitatione, seems to indicate that he was not committed to holenmerianism.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Locke and Holenmerism

Biase

2019

LockeStud

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“…Pasnau suggests that this metaphysical aspect of substantial forms is particularly striking in those passages that associate the form of a substance with its function. Aristotle remarks that the form of a house is simply being a ‘covering for bodies and chattels’ and that in general ‘what a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can perform its function; an eye for instance, when it can see’ (quoted in Pasnau, 2011: 558). If to be an eye is just to see, then the loss of that characteristic function entails the loss of the thing's defining form and so the loss of its identity.…”

Section: Forms Essences and Identitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Locke recognizes that, as a purely factual matter, the natural world does admit of objective clustering of individuals. For example, he writes ‘nature makes many particular things, which do agree one with another in many sensible qualities, and probably too, in their internal frame and constitution’, and notes ‘I do not deny, but nature, in the constant production of particular beings makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and kin with one to another’ (in Pasnau, 2011: 646). Where Pasnau locates the difference between the scholastics and Locke on this matter is not with the acceptance/rejection of natural kinds but in how close to the extreme acceptance of natural kinds each comes.…”

Section: Forms Essences and Identitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Locke every intrinsic aspect comes from its real essence, and so has an equal right to count as essential to the thing, the distinction between propria and pure accidents collapses. The result is that ‘particular beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their qualities equally essential, and everything, in each individual will be essential to it’ (in Pasnau, 2011: 659). Pasnau notes that on this view, the only case in which two individuals could objectively be placed in the same kind is if they were qualitatively identical.…”

Section: Forms Essences and Identitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Essentialism and the Social

Pratten

2012

The Sociological Review

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In this paper I show that two senses are often assigned to essences in frameworks that award them a significant ontological status. There is both a defining sense and a more concrete‐explanatory sense. Once this distinction is recognized, competing forms of essentialism can be differentiated and their implications more easily explored. As an example of work where the defining and the concrete‐explanatory senses of essence are tied closely together I consider the essentialism outlined by Rom Harré as part of his analysis of the practices of natural scientists. As an illustration of a position where the two senses are de‐coupled and priority given to the defining sense I examine the essentialism Charles Peirce develops in his mature account of natural classes. I show that arguments concerning the scope of essentialism and its relevance for the study of social phenomena depend heavily on the sense of essence prioritized. The focus on these two senses of essence facilitates a better understanding of the forms of essentialism defended by Harré and Peirce and helps identify the challenges contemporary realists face as they seek to defend an essentialism that applies to the social.

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“…I used to call the view that properties are immanent in objects inherence realism (Audi ), but was shocked to discover that ‘inherence’ comes from the Latin for sticking on —almost the exact opposite of the conception of properties I favor! (I learned this from a quotation from Locke's Essay (II.13.20) in Pasnau , p. 203.)…”

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confidence: 99%

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

Audi

2018

Nous

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Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly‐veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects (partial intrinsic resemblance) requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object is roughly for it to be wholly present in that object. (So understood, immanence does not imply repeatability, and thus tropes count as immanent.) If two objects are intrinsically similar in one way but not another, there must be a difference between the two ways. And if the similarity is between the objects as they are in themselves, then this difference, too, must be within the objects. Partial intrinsic resemblance thus requires internal structure. Without it, there can be no distinctions between ways in which things are intrinsically alike and ways in which they aren't. I will argue, further, that distinctions between properties that transcend objects fail to account for the possibility of partial intrinsic resemblance.

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Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671

Cited by 204 publications

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Locke and Holenmerism

Locke and Holenmerism

Essentialism and the Social

Partial Resemblance and Property Immanence

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