Metaphor, Relevance and the 'Emergent Property' Issue

Abstract

: The interpretation of metaphorical utterances often results in the attribution of emergent properties, which are neither standardly associated with the individual constituents in isolation nor derivable by standard rules of semantic composition. An adequate pragmatic account of metaphor interpretation must explain how these properties are derived. Using the framework of relevance theory, we propose a wholly inferential account, and argue that the derivation of emergent properties involves no special interpretive mechanisms not required for the interpretation of ordinary, literal utterances.

Complementary perspectives on metaphor: Cognitive linguistics and relevance theory

“…Sperber and Wilson (in press) state that ''relevance theory's account of metaphor is on the lean side, and is bound to disappoint those who feel that verbal metaphor deserves a full-fledged theory of its own, or should be at the center of a wider theory of language, or even of thought.'' We do not share this view; yet agree with Sperber and Wilson (in press) and Wilson and Carston (2006) that metaphors are not an extraordinary phenomenon of language. Within relevance theory, speakers are not constrained to say what is strictly speaking true, because in many situations speaking loosely is the best way to achieve optimal relevance.…”

“…Thus, Carston (2002) does not really have an answer to the question of how to close the gap between an encoded concept and an ad hoc concept in cross-category metaphors. Wilson and Carston (2006), however, claim that this 'emergent property issue' is something that relevance theory can cope with and they suggest a thoroughly inferential account of metaphor interpretation. In fact, they provide two inferential models.…”

“…Speaking metaphorically is just another way of adhering to the presumption of ''optimal relevance'' (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 270), part of which can be achieved by poetic effects. As we describe in greater detail below, relevance theory does not assume that cross-domain mappings are a central part of metaphor understanding (Wilson and Carston, 2006).…”

“…A different perspective on metaphor comes from relevance theory (Carston, 2002;Pilkington, 2000;Sperber and Wilson, 1995, in press;Wilson and Carston, 2006), which is rooted in a broad theoretical framework for explaining cognition and communication. The relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation proposes that a fundamental assumption about human cognition is that people pay attention to information that seems most relevant to them.…”

“…A different perspective on metaphor is offered by relevance theory (Carston, 2002;Sperber and Wilson, 1995, in press;Wilson and Carston, 2006). Relevance theory also presents a cognitive orientation to thought and communication in its primary claim that human cognition is geared to the maximization of relevance, such that each act of ostensive communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995).…”