Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory

Dewey, Caleb

doi:10.1080/13546783.2022.2047106

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…Another question concerns the gradual or discrete nature of deliberation engagement (Dewey, 2021(Dewey, , 2022. In the current model specification, I focused on the extent of deliberation.…”

Section: Deliberation Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Neys

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena—from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision-making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic—precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

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Section: Deliberation Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Neys

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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“…In many of these cases, the description of the framework can be taken either as instrumental or substantial. Dewey (2022), for instance, defines Type 1 and Type 2 processing, respectively, as processing that precedes or follows metacognitive control: "if some initial judgment by default reasoning causes feelings of error that exceed the threshold, metacognitive control may decide to intervene. Little is known about the specific effects of this intervention: some speculate that it increases working memory, time, and other resources that are available to reasoning" (20.…”

Section: Discussion: a Tool For Every Branchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Later, Stephens et al (2018) and De Neys (2021: 1415-1419), considering the previously ignored concept, showed the evidence presented by Evans and Stanovich (2013) neither confirms nor falsifies DPT, and so does not conclusively demonstrate a qualitative distinction between types of processes. Although some authors still argue, for instance, that "to prove the existence of two qualitatively different types of information processing acts, one characteristic is sufficient" (Nadurak 2021), both De Neys (2021) and Dewey (2021Dewey ( , 2022, mentioned the ambiguity surrounding the qualitative/quantitative distinction, and the former even argued for the scientific irrelevance of the debate -as deciding between qualitative and quantitative does not contribute to a better understanding of the difference between intuitive and deliberate judgments. Thus, I shall provide a classification of Dual-Process Theories that (1) avoids that Dual-Process Theories are treated as a general class and attacked collectively;…”

Section: Evans and Stanovich's Dual-process Theory: The Clean Versionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Kinds of Process or Two Kinds of Processing? Disambiguating Dual-Process Theories

Augusto

2023

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Dual-Process Theories (D-PTs) claim there are two qualitatively different types of processes in the human brain-mind. Despite forming the basis for several areas of cognitive science, they are still shrouded in ambiguity: critics erroneously attack D-PTs as a whole (e.g., Evans and Stanovich Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(3), 2013), the qualitative/quantitative distinction is not clear enough (De Neys Perspectives on Psychological Science 16 (6): 1412–1427, 2021; Dewey 2022) and, given this criterion, deciding between qualitative or quantitative differences may even be scientifically irrelevant (De Neys 2021). As a way of disambiguating the discussion and clarifying what exactly means to claim the existence of a second type of process, I define two possible categories of D-PT: The substantial and the instrumental. In the substantial case, Type 2 processes are subpersonal level ones. In the instrumental case, Type 2 processing is a personal level phenomenon that does not necessarily imply subpersonal level Type 2 processes. Discussing the different implications of each of the categories, I use as a main example to illustrate the ambiguity – and the exercise of disambiguation – the model proposed by Evans and Stanovich (2013), making clear its substantial character, and contrast it with Frankish’ (2009) – a clear case of instrumental D-PT. Finally, I discuss the contributions this distinction can make. By making the discussion clearer, it can provide a relatively unanimous framework for dual- and single-process theorists (the instrumental version) and clearer desiderata for those wishing to defend the substantive one.

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“…This explains why the CRT has been so popular in research on cognitive control (see De Neys, 2012, 2014 for reviews). For example, I've argued that recent studies using the CRT (e.g., Hoover & Healy, 2017, 2019, 2021 provide the most effective ways to isolate errors in metacognitive control, which functions to modulate the exercise of the capacity for algebraic reasoning (Dewey, 2022).…”

Section: §2 Norm Arbitrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hume (1739) was prepared to accept these radical implications-in fact, he built his entire philosophy around it-but most psychologists probably aren't. 19 For example, I recently developed a novel kind of task design that explicitly requires the use of hard norms (Dewey, 2022). During the review process for that paper, though, I received strong criticism from some reviewers for using hard norms and was directed to Elqayam & Evans (2011).…”

Section: §2 Norm Arbitrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks

Dewey

2022

Synthese

Self Cite

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The psychology of reasoning uses norms to categorize responses to reasoning tasks as correct or incorrect in order to interpret the responses and compare them across reasoning tasks. This raises the arbitration problem: any number of norms can be used to evaluate the responses to any reasoning task and there doesn't seem to be a principled way to arbitrate among them. Elqayam and Evans have argued that this problem is insoluble, so they call for the psychology of reasoning to dispense with norms entirely. Alternatively, Stupple and Ball have argued that norms must be used, but the arbitration problem should be solved by favouring norms that are sensitive to the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. In this paper, I argue that the design of reasoning tasks requires the selection of norms that are indifferent to the factors that influence human responses to the tasks-which aren't knowable during the task design phase, before the task has been given to human subjects. Moreover, I argue that the arbitration problem is easily dissolved: any well-designed task will contain instructions that implicitly or explicitly specify a single determinate norm, which specifies what would count as a solution to the task-independently of the context, constraints, and goals of human reasoning. Finally, I argue that discouraging the use of these a priori task norms may impair the design of novel reasoning tasks.

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Metacognitive control in single- vs. dual-process theory

Cited by 27 publications

References 79 publications

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Two Kinds of Process or Two Kinds of Processing? Disambiguating Dual-Process Theories

Arbitrating norms for reasoning tasks

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