Mere formalities: fictional normativity and normative authority

Abstract

It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on what makes standards like etiquette ‘not really normative’. I defend a fictionalist theory on which etiquette is ‘not really normative’ in roughly the same way that Sherlock is ‘not really a detective’, and show that fictionalism about some normative standards helps us explain the possibility of normative authority.

The normative property dualism argument

“…I think that this comparative neglect is unjustified, especially given that the most prominent modern development of the conceivability 9 The relevant ought-concept I'm imagining figuring in this agent's belief is the ought simpliciter. For defences of the coherence of simpliciter normative concepts see Wodak (2019), McPherson (2018) and Case (2016). 10 A similar argument can be found in McGinn (2001).…”

Advice for Analytic Naturalists

“…For worries about the coherence of the ought simpliciter see Baker (2018). For defences of the ought simpliciter see Wodak (2019), Dorsey (2014: ch. 1), andCase (2016).…”

How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?

“…Normative facts can come in different flavors. While there remains some plurality in the terminology used to divide these flavors up, I will follow one standard usage and distinguish between formal and authoritative normativity 29 [50][51][52][53]. Formal normativity is, in an important sense, 'cheap' and, in Howard & Laskowski's phrase, not inherently "deliberation-worthy" 30 [50].…”