Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics

Abstract

A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value. This has proved an exceedingly difficult task. In this paper I shall state and discuss two ‘trilemmas’, or choices between three unappealing alternatives, which the population ethicist must face. The first trilemma is not new. It originates with Derek Parfit's well-known ‘Mere Addition Paradox’, and was first explicitly stated by Yew-Kwang Ng. I shall argue that one horn of this trilemma is less unattractive than Parfit and others have claimed. The second trilemma, which is a kind of mirror image of the first, appears hitherto to have gone unnoticed. Apart from attempting to resolve the two trilemmas, I shall suggest certain features which I believe a plausible welfarist axiology should possess. The details of this projected axiology will, however, be left open.

After the Millennium Development Goals. Remarks on the ethical assessment of global poverty reduction success

“…In this field, the problem of 'adding more people' is often discussed: is it automatically good, if a generally satisfied person is added to the population, other things being equal (Parfit 1984: 381;Chan 2003;Carlson 1998)? While 'satisfied' cannot of course be equated with 'rich', the situation is comparable enough, if poverty is seen as ethically evil.…”

The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics

“…10 See Arrhenius [2000], Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson [1991], Carlson [1998], McMahan [1981] and Parfit [1976Parfit [ , 1982Parfit [ , 1984.…”

“…It is difficult to see why it is repugnant and, for that reason, we have omitted it. See Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998] and Carlson [1998].…”

Population Principles with Number‐Dependent Critical Levels

“…8 See Arrhenius [1997], Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson [1991], Carlson [1998], McMahan [1981], Ng [1989] and Parfit [1976Parfit [ , 1982Parfit [ , 1984.…”

“…Weak expansion equivalence and extended independence of the utilities of unconcerned individuals together imply expansion equivalence and, furthermore, all critical levels must be the same (see, for example, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson [1995, 1998, 2000). This observation is useful in proving the following characterization result for critical-level generalized utilitarianism (see ).…”