Mental state attribution and the temporoparietal junction: An fMRI study comparing belief, emotion, and perception

Abstract

By age 2, children attribute referential mental states such as perceptions and emotions to themselves and others, yet it is not until age 4 that they attribute representational mental states such as beliefs. This raises an interesting question: Is attribution of beliefs different from attribution of perceptions and emotions in terms of its neural substrate? To address this question with a high degree of anatomic specificity, we partitioned the TPJ, a broad area often found to be recruited in theory of mind tasks, into 2 neuroanatomically specific regions of interest: Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) and Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL). To maximize behavioral specificity, we designed a tightly controlled verbal task comprised of sets of single sentences - sentences identical except for the type of mental state specified in the verb (belief, emotion, perception, syntax control). Results indicated that attribution of beliefs more strongly recruited both regions of interest than did emotions or perceptions. This is especially surprising with respect to STS, since it is widely reported in the literature to mediate the detection of referential states - among them emotions and perceptions - rather than the inference of beliefs. An explanation is offered that focuses on the differences between verbal stimuli and visual stimuli, and between a process of sentence comprehension and a process of visual detection.

Neural correlates of causal attribution in negative events of depressed patients: Evidence from an fMRI study

“…An early study revealed that bilateral IPL was more activated by beliefs, but equally activated by fixation (Zaitchik et al, 2010). This finding raises the possibility that belief attribution is possibly similar to the resting state, when the brain is not engaged in any directed task.…”

The overlapping relationship between emotion perception and theory of mind

“…'she thinks that the door is open' = belief perception vs. 'she is afraid that the door is open' = emotion perception) followed by yes/no has suggested a double dissociation in which EP recruits the right superior temporal gyrus, but belief perception recruits dorsolateral PFC (BA 9) and the middle temporal gyrus (Zaitchik, et al, 2010). Executive control from dorsolateral PFC may be needed because simulating someone's likely state of mind entails holding this representation in mind (working memory), updating it with what is known about reality but suppressing the information about reality that does not apply in the alternative state (inhibition), and the cognitive flexibility to switch between representations (Van Hoeck, et al, 2014).…”

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

“…Similarly, the TPJ areas were linked to the representation of mental and non-mental perspectives (Perner et al, 2006; Perner and Leekam, 2008). The right TPJ was specifically linked to the representation of beliefs, as it was found to respond more strongly when reading statements about a person's thoughts than when reading statements about physical appearance or bodily sensations (Saxe and Powell, 2006), and also compared to reading statements about a person's emotions and perceptions (Zaitchik et al, 2010). In another study, an interesting observation was made for the left TPJ.…”