Mental Models or Probabilistic Reasoning or Both

Abstract

The present paper presents an overview of contemporary reasoning research to examine the evidence for and implications of the Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning. The Dual Strategy Model of Reasoning proposes that there are two types of reasoning strategy applied in deductive reasoning - counterexample and statistical. The paper considers Mental Models Theory and The Probability Heuristics Model as candidate specifications for these respective strategies and hypotheses are proposed on this basis. The Dual Strategy Model is further considered in the context of Dual Process theory, the Dual Source Model and Meta-reasoning and implications of the synergy between these proposals are considered. We finally consider the Dual Strategy Model in the context of individual differences, and normative considerations before proposing novel hypotheses and further avenues of research which we argue require exploration in this context.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

“…These strategies have implications for the interplay between deliberation and normative standards. Participants adopting a counterexample strategy (based on mental models) versus a probabilistic strategy (based on information gain or probability heuristics; Beeson, Stupple, Schofield, & Staples, 2019;Oaksford & Chater, 2009;Verschueren et al, 2005) may differ in their task construal and understanding of "correct" answers. Although it is unclear whether strategies necessarily entail adoption of particular normative standards, responding to a problem in terms of information gain versus a necessary truth derived from a mental model would reasonably be assumed to require differing degrees of deliberation and differing use of intuitive cues.…”

Explaining normative–deliberative gaps is essential to dual-process theorizing

“…These strategies have implications for the interplay between deliberation and normative standards. Participants adopting a counterexample strategy (based on mental models) versus a probabilistic strategy (based on information gain or probability heuristics; Beeson, Stupple, Schofield, & Staples, 2019; Oaksford & Chater, 2009; Verschueren et al, 2005) may differ in their task construal and understanding of “correct” answers. Although it is unclear whether strategies necessarily entail adoption of particular normative standards, responding to a problem in terms of information gain versus a necessary truth derived from a mental model would reasonably be assumed to require differing degrees of deliberation and differing use of intuitive cues.…”