Mental Language and Understanding of Epistemic and Emotional Mental States

The origins of children’s metamemory: The role of theory of mind

“…Theoretically, they support Kuhn's (2000) model and encourage us to view ToM understanding as part of a more general metarepresentational ability. Such a view is also consistent with a growing body of research showing significant relations between ToM and other aspects of metacognitive knowledge such as metareading , metacognitive vocabulary (Antonietti, Liverta-Sempio, Marchetti, & Astington, 2006), and epistemological beliefs about learning (Lecce, Caputi, & Pagnin, 2009, 2015. Empirically, the results reported above speak to the cognitive consequences of ToM and, together with the data that show an association with school achievement (Blair & Razza, 2007;Lecce, Caputi, & Hughes, 2011;Lecce, Caputi, et al, 2014), prompt researchers to design intervention studies for preschoolers and school-aged children (Lecce, Bianco, Devine, Hughes, & Banerjee, 2014).…”

Does sensitivity to criticism mediate the relationship between theory of mind and academic achievement?

“…However, other potential mediators deserve attention. These include children's metacognitive knowledge about the processes involved in reading comprehension and teaching (Astington & Pelletier, 1996), children's understanding of the interpretive nature of knowledge (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996), and children's metacognitive vocabulary (i.e., knowledge of mental state terms) (Antonietti, Liverta-Sempio, Marchetti, & Astington, 2006).…”

Theory of mind and language of mind in narratives: Developmental trends from kindergarten to primary school

“…On the one hand, it is held that the changes in language about mind take place thanks to conceptual development. Those who take this approach consider that language reflects the mental skills which the child is acquiring, yet that language does not, itself, contribute to the development of a theory of mind (Antonietti, Liverta-Sempio, & Marchetti, 2006). Those who assume the existence of specific innate models (Fodor, 1992), which would constrain development, view language as a factor that might play a role in the child's false-belief mind skills.…”