Memory-Modulation: Self-Improvement or Self-Depletion?

Abstract

Autobiographical memory is fundamental to the process of self-construction. Therefore, the possibility of modifying autobiographical memories, in particular with memory-modulation and memory-erasing, is a very important topic both from the theoretical and from the practical point of view. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the state of the art of some of the most promising areas of memory-modulation and memory-erasing, considering how they can affect the self and the overall balance of the “self and autobiographical memory” system. Indeed, different conceptualizations of the self and of personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory are what makes memory-modulation and memory-erasing more or less desirable. Because of the current limitations (both practical and ethical) to interventions on memory, I can only sketch some hypotheses. However, it can be argued that the choice to mitigate painful memories (or edit memories for other reasons) is somehow problematic, from an ethical point of view, according to some of the theories of the self and personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory, in particular for the so-called narrative theories of personal identity, chosen here as the main case of study. Other conceptualizations of the “self and autobiographical memory” system, namely the constructivist theories, do not have this sort of critical concerns. However, many theories rely on normative (and not empirical) conceptions of the self: for them, the actions aimed at mitigating or removing specific (negative) memories can be seen either as an improvement or as a depletion or impairment of the self.

Memory Modification and Authenticity: A Narrative Approach

“…Both views are rarely anymore fully adopted in this stark form. Attenuated versions are still in use, such as Erler’s true self view [ 1 ] or Harry Frankfurt’s wholeheartedness approach [ 47 ] which can be understood as a version of a self-creation view and which is also prevalent in the neuroethical debate [ 1 , 4 , 5 , 8 , 37 ]. An essentialist view on authenticity is a common concept of folk understanding [ 48 ] and it seems to have functional merits [ 49 ].…”

“…To analyze MMTs based on a dual-basis process view of authenticity, I suggest a narrative account of authenticity which can accommodate both criteria. Contra Andrea Lavazza [ 4 , 71 ], my account should show that authenticity does not presuppose a notion of “rigid identity” but can be defined on the basis of a dynamic, narrative concept of the self. The guiding idea behind narrativism is that we experience our lives as an internalized, evolving story [ 34 , 35 , 72 ].…”

“…The contributions in the neuroethical literature on MMTs tend to discuss memory modification predominantly in terms of thought experiments, specific methods for memory modification, or a combination of the two. Commonly used thought experiments are Liz, as introduced by Alexandre Erler [ 1 ], who uses MMTs to cope with her memories of how she was bullied at school [ 4 , 8 , 27 – 29 ] or Lady Macbeth who modifies her memories of how she contributed to the murder of the king [ 1 , 3 , 7 , 30 – 32 ]. Regarding specific methods for memory modification, there are lively discussions on the ethical implications of memory modification through Propranolol [ 2 , 4 , 7 , 31 ] or optogenetics [ 8 , 24 , 26 , 25 ].…”

“…Commonly used thought experiments are Liz, as introduced by Alexandre Erler [ 1 ], who uses MMTs to cope with her memories of how she was bullied at school [ 4 , 8 , 27 – 29 ] or Lady Macbeth who modifies her memories of how she contributed to the murder of the king [ 1 , 3 , 7 , 30 – 32 ]. Regarding specific methods for memory modification, there are lively discussions on the ethical implications of memory modification through Propranolol [ 2 , 4 , 7 , 31 ] or optogenetics [ 8 , 24 , 26 , 25 ]. Both routes, thought experiments as well as existing methods for memory modification, can provide valuable insights, but they do have limitations.…”

The Memory-Modifying Potential of Optogenetics and the Need for Neuroethics

“…In many conceptions of authenticity, deriving from various lineages-essentialist (self-discovery) (e.g., [102]), existentialist (self-creation) (e.g., [103] [1943]), and dual-basis framework (e.g., [104])-being "truthful" to oneself is directly associated with living in alignment with one's values. Thus, a person whose values have been changed as a result of alteration of the valence of her memories would commit either an act of "betrayal" of her true self, according to the essentialists, since, as a result of her evaluative change, she might begin to lead a life inconsistent with her given and fixed essence (for further considerations, see [105]), or an act of self-deception, according to the "Sartrean" existentialists, as the process of self-creation would stem not from the values that she had freely chosen, but from those constituting side effects of the memory-modifying intervention (for additional considerations see, [99,106]). Either way, such an intervention may pose a threat to the patient's authenticity.…”