Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Shu, Feng; Liu, Yaojun; Liu, Xingwen; Zhou, Xiaobing

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.10.055

Cited by 23 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…It is important to note that the roles of conformity and anti-conformity change as the frequency of altruism changes, and conformity can facilitate the increase of altruism if it reaches a sufficiently high frequency. Moreover, we assumed a random choice of role models, whereas if the population were subdivided into groups [43, 44, 45, 47] or connected in networks [48, 49, 50, 51], the roles of conformity and anti-conformity in the evolution of altruism may differ. In a group selection model for the evolution of altruism as a cultural trait, Molleman et al [47] showed that if altruism had initially reached fixation in a single sub-group (e.g., due to stochastic effects), conformity may favor its increase in the meta-population, but if altruism arose due to rare mutations in the initially selfish population, conformity prevented its invasion.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, HRG does not have predictive power (as β and γ incorporate the dependent variable, namely the change in average trait value over one generation) [29, 40, 41], and does not account for non-vertical transmission of altruism (but see [42]). Studies of altruism as a cultural trait under non-vertical transmission have commonly used the frameworks of group selection [43, 44, 45, 46, 47] or network reciprocity [48, 49, 50, 51], as opposed to kin selection (but see [28, 52]). These studies have reached opposing conclusions on whether conformity—a type of non-vertical transmission that has been defined in different ways [53] but generally refers to a tendency to adopt more common variants—facilitates [43, 44, 49, 50, 51] or hinders [45, 48] the evolution of altruism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Oblique transmission, conformity, and preference in the evolution of altruism

Ram

2020

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The evolution of altruism is frequently studied using models of non-random assortment, including kin selection. In genetic kin selection models, under certain assumptions including additive costs and benefits, the criterion for altruism to invade a population is Hamilton’s rule. Deviations from Hamilton’s rule occur when vertical transmission has cultural and genetic components, or when costs and benefits are combined multiplicatively. Here, we include oblique and vertical cultural transmission and genetic transmission in four models—two forms of parent-to-offspring altruism, sibling-to-sibling altruism, and altruism between offspring that meet assortatively—under additive or multiplicative assumptions. Oblique transmission may be conformist (anti-conformist), where the probability that an individual acquires a more common cultural variant is greater (less) than its frequency. Inclusion of conformist or anti-conformist oblique transmission may reduce or increase the threshold for invasion by altruism relative to Hamilton’s rule. Thresholds for invasion by altruism are lower with anti-conformity than with conformity, and lower or the same with additive rather than multiplicative fitness components. Invasion by an allele that increases the preference for altruism does not depend on oblique phenotypic transmission, and with sibling-to-sibling altruism, this allele’s invasion threshold can be higher with additive rather than multiplicative fitnesses.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Oblique transmission, conformity, and preference in the evolution of altruism

Ram

2020

Preprint

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“…In this case, a player applies the memory rule to define her/his action based on her/his historical payoffs. The neighbours' historical optimal procedures are also taken into account to define the player's strategy [19]. The authors verified that historical information promotes cooperation in three classical evolutionary social dilemmas, including the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…Therefore, players have memory, influencing their planning to maximize their earnings. Although this is an essential ingredient to model cooperation, only a recent paper addressed this issue [19]. In this case, a player applies the memory rule to define her/his action based on her/his historical payoffs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the effect of memory on the Prisoner's Dilemma game in correlated networks

Lotfi,

Rodrigues

2022

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Game theory is fundamental to understanding cooperation between agents. Mainly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known model that has been extensively studied in complex networks. However, although the emergence of cooperation has been investigated before, the influence of memory in its evolution is not well understood. This paper presents a detailed study of cooperation dynamics in which agents have memory. We simulate the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on random, scale-free and networks presenting degree-degree correlation. Through extensive simulations, we show that assortativity can improve cooperation when the temptation to defect increases. Moreover, we show that the inclusion of memory decreases the network structure influence. Our results contribute to understanding the role of the network structure and the player's memory of cooperation.

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“…Therefore, many scholars have also focused on the network structure: The first evolutionary game proposed by Novak on the regular network [27], and then the research on the evolutionary game on the small-world network and the scale-free network has also become a hot spot for scholars [28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36]. In addition to these 5 types of mechanisms, some scholars have found that adding memory mechanism [37,38,39] can also promote cooperation. The idea of the memory mechanism is that the individual can refer to the strategies of the previous rounds and choose the strategy in the round with the highest benefit for him to play this round of the game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The mechanism of individual time cost heterogeneity promotes cooperation in snowdrift game

Wang

2020

Preprint

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Cost of time passing plays an important role when investigate the collective behaviour in real world. Each rational individual can get a more reasonable strategy by comprehensively considering the time cost. Motivated by the fact, we here propose a mechanism with individual time cost heterogeneity whose core lies in two aspects: 1. The individuals in the rule network are divided into 2 groups: high-time cost and low-time cost. 2. Each individual is endowed with a time cost parameter, and the individuals take into account the effect of time cost on the benefit when they interact with a neighbour. The synchronous updating algorithm is used to study the evolution of cooperation with time cost on a regular lattice. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism effectively promotes cooperation in the snowdrift game. Moreover, it is revealed that the following reasons lead to a higher level of cooperation: The higher time cost, the more individuals of high-time cost in the group, and the more differences of time cost between groups when low-time cost remains unchanged.

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Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Cited by 23 publications

References 55 publications

Oblique transmission, conformity, and preference in the evolution of altruism

Oblique transmission, conformity, and preference in the evolution of altruism

On the effect of memory on the Prisoner's Dilemma game in correlated networks

The mechanism of individual time cost heterogeneity promotes cooperation in snowdrift game

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