Members and leaders in Russian party organisations

Chaisty, Paul

doi:10.1080/21599165.2012.683114

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…The tables identify only one party that visibly contributed to the lowering of the average age of the regional deputies, the LDPR. This is consistent with the electoral rhetoric of the LDPR that purposefully targets the younger sections of the electorate (White and Feklyunina 2011), as well as with the recognisably small amount of information that we have about the party's organisational mode of operation (Chaisty 2012). The deputies of other parties, including A Just Russia, as well as independents, tended to be younger than those of United Russia and the KPRF, but the difference was less pronounced than in the case of the LDPR.…”

Section: The Analysis and Findingssupporting

confidence: 78%

Growing Old Without Grace: Electoral Authoritarianism and the Age Composition of Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

Golosov¹

2014

Representation

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Section: The Analysis and Findingssupporting

confidence: 78%

Growing Old Without Grace: Electoral Authoritarianism and the Age Composition of Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

Golosov¹

2014

Representation

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“…Control over the party, indeed, is preserved through a complex process of political Centralizing tendencies are further emphasized by the overlap between the party's bureaucratic and political leadership, hence the decreasing inclusiveness of the narrow executive office (Katz and Mair, 1994). While after 2004 the composition of the Presidium experienced a period of greater diversification (Chaisty, 2012), since the early 2010s, on average, 93% of the membership of the Presidium served in public offices, 6 The Presidium comprises 19 members.…”

Section: )mentioning

confidence: 99%

Between Loyalty and Opposition

Bondarenko

2023

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

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This article analyzes intra-party dynamics and the transformation of the role of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) within the Russian political system. Although the party is considered to be a member of the so-called “loyal” opposition, the increasing volatility of the party system and growing political instability have implications for future relations between the KPRF and the regime. The article argues that despite the organizational strength and demonstrated loyalty to the regime, the party is currently affected by the problem of “dual commitment,” epitomized by a growing center-regions cleavage and ideological incoherence. These two vectors of internal divide are shaped by the context emerging from different intra-system trends and by demographic trends affecting the interaction between the leadership and the rank-and-file of the KPRF. While in the wake of some surprising results from the 2021 legislative elections, the party still seems committed to demonstrating loyalty to the regime; in the long run, the growing intra-party cleavage is likely to affect the role of the KPRF within the party system, opening a new window of opportunity for opposition politics in Russian regions.

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“…Their opposition appeal is therefore limited. Both the KPRF and the LDPR are, in effect, niche parties that enjoy stable but limited support stemming, in the former case, from some of the voters' traditional allegiance to the communist ideology (Hale and Colton, 2010), and in the latter case, from the personal appeal of the long-standing leader of the LDPR, Vladimir Zhirinovsky (Chaisty, 2012). A Just Russia is different in the sense that, while lacking any significant ideological or nation-wide personal appeal to the voters, it relies upon the personal resources of its influential members in the localities.…”

Section: The Interplay Of Authoritarian Dominance and Quasi-democratimentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections

Golosov

2018

International Area Studies Review

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While formally a federation that vests significant powers in the sub-national bodies of government and leaves it for its federal units and municipalities to decide who will govern them by conducting elections, the Russian Federation is effectively a centralized authoritarian state. This paper uses evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections in Russia to examine the role of formal political institutions in sustaining the country’s political regime. The analysis shows that the political domination of the pro-government party over the regional political assemblies is sustained by a complex combination of party regulations and electoral rules. In particular, gubernatorial elections are organized and conducted in a way that ensures the victories of the incumbent governors who are effectively appointed by the president of Russia.

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Members and leaders in Russian party organisations

Cited by 7 publications

References 13 publications

Growing Old Without Grace: Electoral Authoritarianism and the Age Composition of Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

Growing Old Without Grace: Electoral Authoritarianism and the Age Composition of Russia's Regional Legislative Assemblies

Between Loyalty and Opposition

Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections

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