Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds

Abstract

Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with Reimarus, Kant distinguishes himself from both Meier and Reimarus on the role of judgement in human consciousness.

Kant and the determinacy of intuition

“…Further, as I argue below, Kant is largely in agreement with Reimarus. Since similar views on animals (e.g., Yvon, 1751/2003) and newborns (e.g., Condillac 1754/1982) are prominent across Europe at the time, we should presume Kant is in dialogue with them, endorsing aspects he agrees with and making explicit where he disagrees—as in his explicit disagreement with G.F. Meier on animals at FS2:58 (see Browning, 2021; Leland, 2019). 5 Thus, while we should be hesitant to rely on the details in Kant's lectures, we should also take the consistency of these comments across multiple decades as evidence they express, at least in outline, Kant's thoughts on animals and infants.…”

“…[…] because they were not in the condition to separate, to connect, to compare representations" (L-Met 29:1033). 6 For readers of Reimarus, it would be obvious Kant is also denying animals possess the kind of awareness necessary for rising above obscure, confused, and indistinct representations (see Browning, 2021;van den Berg, 2018). 7 But approaching Kant through Reimarus also adds clarity to his comments on infants, where a sharp difference is drawn concerning how humans gain awareness of their world.…”

“…The resulting picture is one where animals “either hav[e] no current consciousness at all of their representations, or at least not a consciousness of the manifold in things […] because they were not in the condition to separate, to connect, to compare representations” (L‐Met 29:1033) 6 . For readers of Reimarus, it would be obvious Kant is also denying animals possess the kind of awareness necessary for rising above obscure, confused, and indistinct representations (see Browning, 2021; van den Berg, 2018). 7…”

“…And the typical defense taken by these readers to Kant's consistent and repeated denial of consciousness to animals is sole that he denies self‐ consciousness. But, as Merritt and Valaris note, voluntary attention depends on self‐conscious affection (B157n); denying this ability to animals would assume they possess only confused and indistinct consciousness (if even that; see Leland, 2018 and Browning, 2021). 11 In short, there is little ground to read Kant as supporting the determinate particular thesis in regards to animals.…”

“…In section three, I turn to one of Kant's contemporaries, H. S. Reimarus, who provides a thorough discussion of animal and infant consciousness. I choose Reimarus because Hein van den Berg has shown Kant's comments on animals are “virtually identical” (van den Berg, 2018, p. 8) to Reimarus's comments, and Jacob Browning (2021, pp. 14–15) has highlighted the similarity of their views on infants.…”