2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3279453
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Meet the Press: Survey Evidence on Financial Journalists As Information Intermediaries

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Cited by 19 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…My design choices and empirical findings are consistent with recent survey evidence in Call et al. [2018] that suggests incentives to create, as opposed to merely disseminate, information are strongest for more prominent media outlets' coverage of highly visible firms.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 81%
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“…My design choices and empirical findings are consistent with recent survey evidence in Call et al. [2018] that suggests incentives to create, as opposed to merely disseminate, information are strongest for more prominent media outlets' coverage of highly visible firms.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 81%
“…In summary, WSJ coverage of S&P 500 earnings is an ideal setting for testing the role of editorial content, including whether it merely disseminates and entertains, or also informs. My design choices and empirical findings are consistent with recent survey evidence in Call et al [2018] that suggests incentives to create, as opposed to merely disseminate, information are strongest for more prominent media outlets' coverage of highly visible firms.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 77%
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“…On the one hand, the media may serve as an external monitor of managerial opportunism, which reduces corporate earnings management behavior. Survey evidence shows that financial journalists believe monitoring companies is one of their most important objectives (Call, Emett, Maksymov, & Sharp, 2018). Numerous empirical studies also find that the media monitors many aspects of firms’ corporate governance, such as financial fraud (Dyck et al., 2010; Miller, 2006), governance violation and weakness (Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 2008; Joe et al., 2009), mergers and acquisitions (Liu & McConnell, 2013), and insider trading (Dai et al., 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 Nevertheless, it is also possible that media co-coverage has no effect on the efficiency of information transfers between the co-covered firms, as investors may only focus on the main story of the article and overlook firms mentioned as background information, given limited attention (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). In addition, as journalists often rely on third-parties' opinion as input to compensate for their lack of financial sophistication (Call et al 2020), their choice of co-coverage firms may contain little new information about the common shocks that affect the co-covered firms, or the correlation between those firms' exposure to common shocks. Thus, co-coverage may have little impact on investors' perception if their evaluation of relatedness is based solely on economic fundamentals.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%