Meditations on the Dream Argument

Levin, Yakir

doi:10.5840/gps1999572

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2004

2022

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“…For recent arguments that such a criterion cannot in principle be given, see Stroud (1984), Levin (1999).…”

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confidence: 99%

The coherence objection to dream scepticism

Filcheva¹

2022

Philosophical Books

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The dream sceptic argues that our ordinary beliefs are not justified because we cannot know that we have not always been dreaming. This is the Always Dreaming Hypothesis (ADH). I develop the traditional coherence objection to dream scepticism and argue that the coherence objection can be reformulated in a way that makes it both plausible and defensible. Considerations about the incoherence of dreams can be given probabilistic expression in a way that shows ADH to be highly improbable. Given the evidence of coherence, ADH can be rationally rejected. Even if ADH is augmented with causal information sufficient to account for the coherence and order of conscious experience, the resulting dream scepticism would then reduce to a BIV‐type scepticism and thus fail to possess independent sceptical force.

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“…For recent arguments that such a criterion cannot in principle be given, see Stroud (1984), Levin (1999).…”

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confidence: 99%