2021
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3830213
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Medicare and the Rise of American Medical Patenting: The Economics of User-Driven Innovation

Abstract: Innovation is part idea generation and part development. We build a model of "innovating-bydoing," whereby ideas come to practitioners. Successful innovation requires that practitioners' ideas be developed through costly effort. Our model nests existing theories of laboratory research and learning-by-doing. Empirically, we analyze the effect of the U.S. Medicare program on medical equipment innovation. Our model's structure allows us to infer the Medicare program's aggregate effects. We estimate that Medicare'… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
(74 reference statements)
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“…We also find that the expansion of health insurance has induced substantial medical R&D. Namely, it raises the rate of medical progress by about 57% over the time span 1965 to 2005 and by about 39% over the time span 1965 to 1990. The latter compares to a 20%-30% increase in medical equipment and device patenting over the same time span that Clemens and Olsen (2021) estimate as a consequence of the introduction of Medicare/Medicaid. We decompose the insurance induced increase in health care spending into a moral hazard effect associated with the subsidization of health care, and the spending increase associated with induced medical change.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 73%
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“…We also find that the expansion of health insurance has induced substantial medical R&D. Namely, it raises the rate of medical progress by about 57% over the time span 1965 to 2005 and by about 39% over the time span 1965 to 1990. The latter compares to a 20%-30% increase in medical equipment and device patenting over the same time span that Clemens and Olsen (2021) estimate as a consequence of the introduction of Medicare/Medicaid. We decompose the insurance induced increase in health care spending into a moral hazard effect associated with the subsidization of health care, and the spending increase associated with induced medical change.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 73%
“…In addition to the direct impact of health insurance on medical spending, Weisbrod (1991) has conjectured an indirect pathway, namely that the expansion of health insurance coverage created incentives to develop new medical technology. Clemens and Olsen (2021) find empirical support for this hypothesis 3 : 20 to 30 percent of medical equipment and device innovation between 1965 and 1990 is explained by the introduction of Medicare/Medicaid in 1965. 4 In a related analysis, Finkelstein (2007) shows that health insurance, does, indeed, explain a spending increase that is more than six times larger than the one suggested by the RAND health insurance experiment once macroeconomic responses, such as induced entry into the hospital market, are accounted for.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
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