Restrictions to media freedom, in the form of repressive defamation legislation, are thought to affect the amount of information about corruption that the media report. Exploiting variation in regulation of speech across states in a federal country, Mexico, and using a novel data set based on content analysis of the local press, I estimate the effect of lack of freedom on the coverage devoted to acts of malfeasance by public officials. Corruption receives significantly less attention in states with a more repressive defamation law. Instrumental variable models corroborate the interpretation of the negative association between regulation and coverage as a causal "chilling effect." R estrictions to media freedom shield officeholders from criticism and prevent voters from holding them accountable. In democratic countries, corruption can be understood as a failure of accountability. Citizens cannot (always) directly observe the performance of the incumbent administration, and politicians (and the bureaucrats they control) exploit the asymmetry in information to extract rents (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997). Cross-country evidence shows that "a free press is bad news for corruption": Having free media (as captured by an index or by a proxy measure) is related to better governance outcomes (Adserá, Boix, and Payne, 2003;Brunetti and Weber 2003). The mechanism posited involves a link between press freedom and the amount of information available to citizens: Governance outcomes are better because thanks to the freedom they enjoy, the media provide more information to citizens, reducing the information asymmetry between citizens and government officials and the related rents the latter Piero Stanig is Senior Research Scientist in Governance and Methodology, ). might extract. In this direction, Leeson (2008) provides empirical evidence based on cross-national survey data about the relationship between the free media, citizens' information, and political apathy.This article provides the first direct estimate of the effect of legal provisions that restrict press freedom on the coverage of political, bureaucratic, and police malfeasance in the media. The estimate, based on a direct measure of coverage, exploits what resembles, to a certain extent, a natural experiment-the fact that the strictness with which speech is regulated varies across different political units (i.e., states) in a federal country. A cross-state analysis in a federal country has a distinctive advantage: A host of other factors (e.g., culture, party system, and political history) that might affect the political content of newspapers is held (almost) constant. Mexico provides a unique opportunity because freedom of speech is regulated by the criminal code (Código Penal) of each state. The intervention by the Supreme Court in freedom of