Media and subnational democracy: the case of Bahia, Brazil

LOYAL TO THE ExECUTIVE: THE EFFECT OF STATE CAPACITY ON LOCAL HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY

“…As Pino (2017) noted, the literature on subnational undemocratic regimes and practices in Latin America generally gives high relevance to subnational executive's ability to reproduce and maintain undemocratic regimes and practices. This ability certainly includes elements that do not involve the local bureaucracy-for example, influencing national politicians (Gibson 2005;Giraudy 2013) or the local media (Behrend 2011;Durazo Herrmann 2017), and access to paramilitaries. 2 However, authors have also argued that patrimonial administrations play a significant role, allowing executives to use state resources discretionally to, for example, finance clientelistic machines, and also affect horizontal accountability by harassing the opposition and obstructing checks and balances (Gervasoni 2010;Durazo Herrmann 2010;Pino 2017;Došek 2019).…”

Local-Level Authoritarianism, Democratic Normative Aspirations, and Antipress Harassment: Predictors of Threats to Journalists in Mexico

“…Corrupt local politicians who abuse human rights with impunity can stay in power by shielding local practices from federal oversight, nationalizing their political influence and monopolizing links between local and national authorities. The tactics of “boundary control,” as Gibson calls these practices, include silencing critics whose voices may reach the national authorities (Article 19 2016; Durazo Herrmann 2016, 2017; Gibson 2013). While Gibson does not explicitly mention censorship or other controls on the press as boundary control mechanisms, clearly, journalists outside national capitals might activate federal accountability chains by exposing corruption, human rights abuses, or other illegal practices.…”