Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

Ishikida, Takashi; Marschak, Thomas

doi:10.1007/bf02499124

Cited by 5 publications

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“…18 For the organization considered in 2.2.7 (N − 1 managers and an Allocator), a similar argument (given in Ishikida and Marschak, 1996) establishes that no suitably smooth mechanism can realize the goal function G (defined in 2.2.7) with a message space dimension less than nL (the message-space dimension of the G-realizing price mechanism that we constructed). In our nL-dimensional test class, the kth activity for manager j (who has n j < L activities) uses only the resource k and earns a profit of 2α…”

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confidence: 76%

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Organization Structure

2008

Concise Encyclopedia of Professional Services Marketing

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This Chapter concerns formal models of organizations that regularly acquire information about a changing environment in order to find actions which are appropriate to the new environment. Some or all members of the organization are specialists. Each of them privately learns something about a particular aspect of the new environment. The organization operates a mechanism, which assembles relevant pieces of the specialists' private observations and uses the assembled information to obtain the desired new action. The mechanism has various informational costs and they are measured in a precise way. The research seeks to characterize mechanisms that strike an appropriate balance between informational cost and the performance of the mechanism's final actions. As costs drop, due to improved Information Technology, the properties of good mechanisms, and hence the structure of the organizations that adopt them, may change. The Chapter starts by examining research in which the organization's members reliably follow the mechanism's rules and so incentives are not an issue. It then turns to research in which each member is self-interested and needs an inducement in order to make the informational efforts that the mechanism requires. A number of unmet Research Challenges are identified. I. INTRODUCTIONThis chapter concerns organizations that acquire information about a changing environment in order to take appropriate actions.The term "organization" is used in many disciplines and is applied to many groups of persons. The term covers government agencies, markets, entire economies, firms, nonprofit institutions, the users of the Internet, the firms in a supply chain, and so on. We shall be concerned with models of organizations where some or all members are specialists: each of them privately learns something about a particular aspect of the organization's newly changed environment. The organization then adjusts its actions. It seeks new actions that are appropriate to the new environment. It could find them by "Direct Revelation" -collecting in one central place all the information about the changed environment that the members have privately collected, and using it to obtain a new action. But that would be wasteful: much of the transmitted information would not be needed. Instead, the organization seeks to balance the benefit of appropriate actions against the costs of learning about the current environment, transmitting some of what has been learned, and using the transmitted information to choose new actions. Advances in Information Technology (IT) may reduce those costs, and that may change the structure of successful organizations. In all the models discussed in this chapter, there is some precise measure of one or more informational costs.The members of our modeled organization might be totally self-interested, or they might behave like loyal and selfless team members (or well-programmed robots), choosing their informational efforts and their actions so as to contribute in the best way to a common goal. In either case ...

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“…An activity uses resources and it generates profit. There are 12 This example is discussed in Ishikida and Marschak (1996). …”

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confidence: 99%

Organization Structure

2008

Concise Encyclopedia of Professional Services Marketing

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“…IM is also related to Sjostrom's (1996) Condition W, but the latter is much stronger in that it allows to construct supporting budget sets verifying x using no information other than x itself. Therefore, Condition W allows F to be fully realized with a "proposed action" protocol described by Ishikida and Marschak (1996), which only announces the alternative to be implemented (formally, F itself satis…es Privacy Preservation).…”

Section: Theorem 2 Choice Rule F Satis…es the Budget Equilibrium Revementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that according to De…nition 9, the empty coalition S = ; will block in any state, hence F can only include alternatives in the set X = fx 2 X : (x; ;) = ;g, which we interpret as the set of feasible alternatives. 17 With this notation, a CU choice rule will include those feasible alternatives that are not blocked by nonempty coalitions.…”

Section: A Class Of Intersection-monotonic Choice Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

Segal

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…Nisan and Segal (2005) show that the answer is "no,"by constructing an allocation problem for which the restriction to demand-query protocols brings about an In general, agents' incentives in a protocol can be manipulated using two instruments: Since this bound is very weak, FS proceed to ask whether it is ever achieved or approached. 36 For BIC implementation, FS do show that the bound is tight, by providing an example in which the communication cost of sel…shness is exponential. The example has two agents:…”

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confidence: 98%

Communication in Economic Mechanisms

Segal¹

Advances in Economics and Econometrics

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This chapter considers the problem of …nding allocations that satisfy certain social goals when economic agents have private information about their preferences. While economists have traditionally considered the problem of providing incentives for agents to fully reveal their preferences, such full revelation is often impractical or undesirable, for several reasons: (1) it may require a prohibitive amount of communication as measured in bits or real numbers, (2) it may be costly for agents to evaluate their complete preferences, and (3) the revealed information may be exploited by the designer or other agents. Thus, we consider the question: What is the minimal information that must be elicited from the agents in order to achieve the goals? Note that the question arises even if agents can be counted on to report truthfully. Segal (2005) shows that for a large class of social problems, any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is desirable is equivalent to giving each agent This chapter was prepared for the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, London, August 19-24, 2005. I gratefully acknowledge …nancial support of the National Science Foundation (grants SES 0214500, 0427770). I also thank my discussant, Roger Myerson, and the participants of too many seminars and conference presentations where some of the research surveyed in the chapter was presented. In particular,

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Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

Abstract: D51, D80, D82, Decentralized mechanisms, Message spaces, Communication costs, Exchange economies,

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Organization Structure

Organization Structure

The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets

Communication in Economic Mechanisms

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