Mechanisms and development of self–other distinction in dyads and groups

Abstract

One contribution of 16 to a theme issue 'Understanding self and other: from origins to disorders'. Subject Areas: cognitionKeywords: self -other distinction, empathy, joint action, social cognition Author for correspondence: Sophie J. Milward e-mail: milwards@ceu.edu Mechanisms and development of selfother distinction in dyads and groups This opinion piece offers a commentary on the four papers that address the theme of the development of self and other understanding with a view to highlighting the important contribution of developmental research to understanding of mechanisms of social cognition. We discuss potential mechanisms linking self -other distinction and empathy, implications for grouping motor, affective and cognitive domains under a single mechanism, applications of these accounts for joint action and finally consider self -other distinction in group versus dyadic settings.In this opinion piece, we will offer a commentary on the four papers that address the theme of the development of self and other understanding with a view to highlighting the important contribution of developmental research to understanding of mechanisms of social cognition. While two of the papers [1,2] provide outlines for a key role of self-other distinction as a route to successful dyadic interaction within motor, cognitive and affective domains, the other two focus on group-level analyses of social cognition that highlight motivational [3] and evolutionary [4] themes. This piece will discuss three issues that arise from these papers. First, we will discuss the claim that distinguishing between self and other is crucial for empathy, and raise some questions about the potential mechanisms that could support this link. Second, we will reflect on the implications for grouping three distinct domains (motor, cognitive and affective) under a single mechanism, as has been suggested by de Guzman et al. [1], and consider self -other distinction in the context of joint action. Finally, we will discuss the potential for uniting what are currently relatively independent literatures on group versus dyadic interaction and clarifying whether the mechanisms suggested in each literature can inform research in the other field.In the study reported by de Guzman et al.[1], participants who had performed a training task that required performing movements opposite to the ones performed by a model subsequently showed signs of increased empathy. As discussed by the authors, this finding seems to suggest that increasing control over self and other representations may increase empathy. One possibility, discussed in detail by Steinbeis [2], is that distinguishing between self and other is helpful because it serves to reduce egocentric bias. While this may be a plausible mechanism when it comes to appreciating differences in beliefs and perspectives, it is unclear how exactly making a distinction between one's own and another's actions could increase empathy. One possibility is that the key process involved is about increasing other-related activations, r...

Transient brain networks underlying interpersonal strategies during synchronized action

“…In recent work, we have shown how interpersonal dynamics in synchronization tasks can be modelled using a network of coupled oscillators ( Heggli et al., 2019a ). We proposed that interpersonal synchronization strategies such as mutual adaptation, leading–following and leading–leading rely on action–perception links modulated by individual decisions to integrate or segregate information related to self-produced actions and the perception of other-produced actions ( Milward and Sebanz, 2016 ; Novembre et al., 2016 ; Koban et al., 2017 ; Heggli et al., 2019a ). While there has been a considerate amount of research on the nature of these types of interpersonal synchronization strategies, we know little about the underlying neural mechanisms ( Konvalinka and Roepstorff, 2012 ; Koban et al., 2017 ).…”

Minimalist Social-Affective Value for Use in Joint Action: A Neural-Computational Hypothesis

“…The notion of minimalism appeals to evolutionary (Tomasello et al, 2005 ; de Waal, 2008 ; Decety, 2011 ) and developmental (Milward et al, 2014 ; Milward and Sebanz, 2016 ; Steinbeis, 2016 ) continuity regarding the mechanisms applicable to social interaction. It provides a bottom-up approach, which attempts to minimize assumptions about the cognitive mechanisms that may account for a particular behavioral phenomenon.…”

The influence of prior intention on joint action: an fNIRS-based hyperscanning study

“…Specifically, the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) has been shown to not only be more activated in the joint condition than in the single condition, but the activation pattern of this area is also regulated by self–other-related processes ( Decety et al , 2004 ; Abe et al , 2019 ). However, despite the needs to consider self–other processes in different types of joint action ( Milward and Sebanz, 2016 ), opinions of those studies differ widely on this issue. For example, some researchers have proposed that the rTPJ is related to a self–other merging process, and a greater degree of cooperation—measured as the degree of influence from the coactor in a Coop task—has been discovered via calculation to relate to the enhanced activation in the rTPJ ( Abe et al , 2019 ).…”