Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities

This paper evaluates the budget transparency of international organizations. Building on IMF, OECD, IPSAS, and Open Budget Survey standards for sovereign‐state budget transparency, we create a 93‐item budget transparency measure reflective of international organization characteristics. International organizations are important global dispensers of accumulated knowledge. This includes the purveying of advice on member state budget transparency. Despite this role, we find only partial budget transparency among our surveyed international organizations. Nonetheless, the international organization financial management and accountability practices were more transparent than their budget process or budget disclosures.

Section: Questionnaire Findingssupporting

confidence: 79%

Partial Two‐Way Mirror: International Organization Budget Transparency

Moloney

Stoycheva

2017

“…By empowerment, we mean the transfer of decision‐making authority and resources to IOs. This includes the transfer of more tasks, the expansion of IO capital and the creation of new financial instruments and programs (Heldt and Schmidtke, ). We argue that governance and issue flexibility are crucial in explaining the BICs’ support of IOE.…”

Section: The Puzzle Of Rising Powers’ Support For Empowermentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… This piece focuses merely on the material dimension of power (authority and resources). Other studies have measured the level of IOE (full, partial, and no empowerment) (Heldt and Schmidtke, ; Graham ). This way of evaluating the power of an IO excludes, for example, technical expertise as a source of power.…”

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confidence: 99%

Rising Powers in Global Economic Governance: Mapping the Flexibility‐Empowerment Nexus

Heldt

Mahrenbach

2018

Given long‐standing criticism of global economic institutions by rising powers, it is puzzling that these same governments supported the transfer of substantial resources and responsibilities to the IMF and the World Bank during recent reform negotiations. We argue rising powers’ support for international organization (IO) empowerment is linked to their concerns regarding an IO's flexibility. We introduce two types of flexibility as being most relevant for rising powers. These include governance flexibility – the extent to which rising powers may participate in IO decision‐making – and issue flexibility – the extent to which rising power preferences are incorporated into IO policies and programs. We illustrate our argument by examining the preferences of the BIC states (Brazil, India and China) towards IMF and World Bank reforms between 2008 and 2012. Drawing on archival material with over 50 statements from BIC representatives, we find, first, that there were clear links between Bank and Fund governance flexibility and the BICs’ support for empowerment of these IOs, but that this was not true for issue flexibility. Second, we find evidence indicating the strategies of individual BIC governments differ within these IOs, suggesting a need to undertake more differentiated studies of rising powers’ IO activities.

“…Each funding source has particular implications for member states’ control over their contributions as well as for the independence of the IO vis‐à‐vis its principals. Researchers therefore use the degree to which an IO is able to generate its revenue autonomously from member states as an indicator to measure particular aspects of delegation to and the autonomy of IOs (Brown, ; Heldt and Schmidtke, ; Hooghe and Marks,). Bauer and Ege, for instance, code whether an IO is primarily self‐financing (high autonomy), dependent on mandatory contributions (medium autonomy) or dependent on voluntary contributions with donors earmarking a substantial portion of the budget for specific purposes (low autonomy).…”

Section: Staff Autonomy In Times Of Contested Financial Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ege and Bauer, ; Reinalda and Verbeek, ), which offers insight into the powers and pathologies of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore, ; Ege, forthcoming). Scholars interested in bureaucratic autonomy regularly use funding and staffing as part of their conceptualizations and measurement to ‘characterize the leeway granted to some public sector organizations’ (Maggetti and Verhoest, , p. 239) and IPAs in particular (Bauer and Ege, ; Heldt and Schmidtke, ; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, , p. 248). A notable argument in debates about IO funding is that the growth of voluntary contributions may affect bureaucratic autonomy by reducing ‘the ability of IO staff to engage in long‐term planning and to perform efficiently’ (Graham, , p. 5).…”

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confidence: 99%

How Financial Resources Affect the Autonomy of International Public Administrations

Ege

Bauer

2017

Voluntary contributions -often earmarked for specific purposes -have become an indispensable source of revenue for international organizations (IOs) and the UN organizations in particular. While the reasons for this trend are regularly studied, its effects on the internal functioning of the organization (especially on the 'international public administration' (IPA) as the organization's secretariat) remain unclear. Given this gap, we study the consequences of increasing financial dependence for the autonomy of IPA staff. Using financial and personnel data of 15 UN agencies over time, our results are in line with the intuitive expectation that more financial resources in the form of voluntary contributions increase the number of staff. We also find evidence, however, that the more an organization depends on voluntary resources (within its broader financial portfolio), the more it reduces the ratio of permanent staff among its total workforce in the subsequent years. The underlying adaption of IPAs' recruitment and career structures to growing financial insecurities has important implications for the autonomy of international bureaucrats and needs to be considered also in terms of its long-term impact on administrative professionalism and organizational performance. Policy Implications• The UN organizations are generally responsive to changes in their fiscal environment. The increasing dependence on voluntary funding leads them to adjust their staffing practices by reducing 'long-term liabilities' in the form of permanent staff.• The observed trend has potentially negative consequences for IPAs' ability to fulfill their mandate because the institutional memory and policy expertise of staff suffers.• Changing staffing patterns may also impair the performance of IPAs as it becomes more difficult for them to attract qualified personnel and keep their current staff motivated.