Measuring multi‐level regulatory governance: Organizational proliferation, coordination, and concentration of influence

Abstract

As regulation increasingly results from the interplay of a wide array of different actors operating at different levels, it has become crucial to focus on how these constellations of regulatory actors operate. Although this research field presents huge potential for theoretical development, we still lack the measurement techniques to allow systematic comparative research. We contribute to filling this gap with four indices measuring crucial characteristics of multi‐actor regulatory arrangements: (i) the scope of organizational proliferation; (ii) the extent of coordination between regulatory actors; (iii) the amount of influence that each individual regulatory actor has on the sector regulation; and (iv) the extent to which the regulatory influence is concentrated in the hands of one or a few actors. We argue that our indices are sufficiently systematic, reliable, and flexible to be applied in a variety of research contexts relating to multi‐level and multi‐actor regulatory governance.

The Formal Delegation of Regulatory Decisions in the Telecommunication Sector: An Explanation Using Classification Trees

“…It is true that formal dispositions can, in some cases, lack real effect. However, we argue that this will be less the case regarding the formal delegation of regulatory decision making because regulatory actors have at least two powerful incentives to comply with what is formally stated (Mathieu et al, ). First, following rules and procedures determines the regulators' procedural reputation, which is important for public organizations (Carpenter & Krause, ).…”

“…Such an approach is not uncommon in the field of regulatory governance (Hanretty & Koop, ; Koop & Lodge, ; Mathieu, Verhoest, & Matthys, ). Previous studies investigated several elements: the institutional characteristics of regulatory agencies and the extent to which they assured independence and accountability; the mechanism provided in legislation to assure coordination in regulatory decision making; and the role of different regulatory actors in regulatory decision making, as indicated in the legislation.…”

“…As an additional argument, we suggest that studying regulatory design, in this case, the formal delegation of regulatory decisions, is necessary to understand regulatory output (Mathieu et al, ). Although a given regulatory decision is formally allocated to a given actor, other actors may indeed try to influence such a decision (Stokman & Van den Bos, ; Stokman & Zeggelink, 1996), and these actors will target their efforts toward the actor that has been given the final decision‐making power.…”

De facto regulatory decision-making processes in telecommunications regulation: explaining influence relationships with exponential random graph models

“…In contrast, studying these relations between actors by analysing the formal decision-making processes as stipulated in legislation, collaboration agreements and procedures (see, e.g. Koop and Lodge 2014;Mathieu et al 2016) runs the risk of excluding influential actors without a formal decision-making role.…”

How Regulatory Decisions are Made at the De Facto Level: Conceptualizing and Measuring Regulatory Decision Making in the Colombian Telecommunications Sector

“…Second, recent research (Aubin and Verhoest, ; Dabbah, ; Ingold et al, ; Koop and Lodge, ; Mathieu, Verhoest, and Matthys, ) has shown that sector regulators must interact with other actors when taking regulatory decisions. Besides the regulator, other public bodies can produce regulation, so it is important to study how the decisions are made and how the interactions occur.…”