Measuring Local Government Transparency

Cruz, Nuno F. da; Tavares, António F.; Marques, Rui Cunha; Jorge, Susana; Sousa, Luís de

doi:10.1080/14719037.2015.1051572

Cited by 205 publications

(189 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…However, the data are now available for that purpose. We capture local government transparency by resorting to an index initially developed by a team assembled by Transparência e Integridade, Associação Cívica , the representative of Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org) in Portugal: MTI, Municipal Transparency Index (da Cruz et al ). MTI is available for all municipalities since 2013 and is based on an analysis of the municipalities’ official websites, coding for the presence or absence of 76 different items of information.…”

Section: Data and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The final score (theoretically ranging from 0 to 100) represents a weighted average of the information provided about each of the seven dimensions, with weights determined in consultation with the advisory group. Data for 2013 were collected in June and July of that year, and local governments were given the possibility to provide feedback about coding before final scores were calculated (see da Cruz et al for further details).…”

Section: Data and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We examine these ideas and test some of their implications empirically in the context of Portuguese local elections, employing data on local economies, fiscal policies, educational policy outcomes, voting returns for the party of the incumbent mayor, and local government transparency, as captured by a Municipal Transparency Index (da Cruz et al ). Our main findings are that in the municipalities that rank higher in terms of disclosure of publicly relevant information to citizens — i.e., more transparent —, voters become more likely to reward outcomes that only produce benefits in the long‐run — improvements in the quality of education — and less likely to reward increases in wages, government expenditures, or deficit spending.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transparency, Policy Outcomes, and Incumbent Support

Aguiar‐Conraria

Magalhães

Veiga³

2019

Kyklos

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Summary Government transparency has been discussed both as a way to decrease informational asymmetries between officeholders and citizens and as part of what makes for procedurally fair governance. These two different lines of argument generate predictions about how transparency should change voters’ reactions to economic and policy outcomes. First, under high transparency, voters should respond less positively to fiscal expansions. Second, they should become more sensitive to incumbents’ ability to deliver outcomes that generate benefits in the long‐run than to current tangible benefits. We test these arguments using municipality level data in Portugal. Controlling for variables that previous research has shown to drive electoral support for incumbents in local elections, only in the least transparent municipalities is support positively related with increases in local current expenditures, budget deficits, and municipal wages. Instead, where transparency is higher, voters are more likely to reward improvements in the quality of education.

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Section: Data and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Transparency, Policy Outcomes, and Incumbent Support

Aguiar‐Conraria

Magalhães

Veiga³

2019

Kyklos

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“…Away from the “progressive opportunity”’ public value criterion that look at social inequities (Bozeman & Johnson, ), Italian decentralization increased territorial disparities regarding access (Ferrario & Zanardi, ; Pavolini & Vicarelli, ) and public expenditures for local infrastructure, but generated little or no economies of scale due to a lack of bargaining power that a single buyer such as a central government could produce. Moreover, the transparency of the local governments was not necessarily higher (da Cruz, Tavares, Marques, Jorge, & de Sousa, ). Spain, the most decentralized nation within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), experienced a rise in health‐care expenditures (Joumard, André, & Nicq, ).…”

Section: Decentralization's Pitfalls In Overseas Exemplars and In Francementioning

confidence: 99%

Recentralization and vertical alignment in the French health‐care system

Simonet

2017

Journal of Public Affairs

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In foreign exemplars, key new public management (NPM) features such as decentralization and devolution of health-care responsibilities had outcomes below expectations. Other NPM traits such as the patient as overseer of reforms or the empowerment of patient remained elusive. In France, the integration of public values such as greater participation of patients and local actors (NGOs and elected officials) and NPM-driven private values such as performance evaluation has yet to be seen. Taking advantage of NPM's failings and austerity agenda, a French welfare elite regained control over health-care policy decisions at the expense of regions and other local actors. NPM outcomes were below expectations. Austerity cures led to weakening of the regional decision spaces, which can be explained under the principal-agent relationship. Accountability shifted to managerial (the professionalization of hospital managers) and legal (governance via regulations) forms in a bid to restore central government control. A democratic recess results from the lack of public engagement in recent health reforms.

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“…Operating back stage provides an opportunity to deploy 'soft power' (Newman, 2012) to exert influence. However, elected politicians and public managers may still be held to account for their decisions back stage rendering some measure of transparency and accountability necessary (Ferreira da Cruz et al, 2015). To ensure this Reh (2013, 68) suggests that informal governance needs a 'formalization' phase.…”

Section: Innovations In Politics -Examining the Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the impact of informal governance on political innovation

Ayres

2016

Public Management Review

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General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms 1 Assessing the impact of informal governance on political innovation ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to examine the role played by 'informal governance' in shaping political innovation. Informal governance can be defined as a means of decision-making that is un-codified, non-institutional and where social relationships play crucial roles. This article explores the impact of informal governance on three dimensions of political innovationinnovations in polity (institutions), politics (process) and policy (outcomes). It argues that an analysis of informal governance is essential if we are to fully understand how political innovation occurs. Research evidence suggest that even when formal structures and procedures are weak, political innovation can still thrive.

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Measuring Local Government Transparency

Cited by 205 publications

References 52 publications

Transparency, Policy Outcomes, and Incumbent Support

Transparency, Policy Outcomes, and Incumbent Support

Recentralization and vertical alignment in the French health‐care system

Assessing the impact of informal governance on political innovation

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