Measurement, ontology, and epistemology: Psychology needs pragmatism-realism

Abstract

Measurement in psychology is at the heart of a major debate in the academic literature. We aim to contribute to a critical discussion of this issue. We propose to reposition the object of this type of measure, namely a mental attribute as measured by mental tests. Mental attributes should be considered not as a true object independent of the knower, but as an emergent property of a person dependent on the social context. On the basis of this clarified ontology, we consider that an empirical approach to measuring a mental attribute is possible. This approach must be resolutely pragmatist and realist. In practical terms, this means that a test needs to be renegotiated relative to the context. The validation of quantitative measures requires verification of a certain number of criteria. Consequently, our work critically explores measures as they are usually implemented in the area of psychometrics.

Thorndike’s Credo: Metaphysics in psychometrics

“… 30. In this respect, it is similar to the kind of position recently argued for by Guyon et al (2018). …”

Quantitative Data From Rating Scales: An Epistemological and Methodological Enquiry

“…Instead, it highlights that we can gain access to this reality only through our human perceptual and cognitive abilities, which inevitably limits our possibilities to explore and understand this reality. This epistemological position comes close to those of critical realism (Bhaskar and Danermark, 2006) and pragmatism-realism (Guyon et al, 2018). They emphasize the reality of the objects of research and their knowability but also that our knowledge about this reality is created on the basis of our practical engagement with and collective appraisal of that reality.…”

“…The strong reliance on rating methods is, however, increasingly criticized (Baumeister et al, 2007; Fahrenberg et al, 2007; Grzyb, 2016; Doliński, 2018). Scholars from various disciplines scrutinize their underlying epistemologies and measurement theories (Wagoner and Valsiner, 2005; Trendler, 2009; Vautier et al, 2012; Hammersley, 2013; Bringmann and Eronen, 2015; Buntins et al, 2016; Tafreshi et al, 2016; Bruschi, 2017; Humphry, 2017; Valsiner, 2017; Guyon et al, 2018). These developments are still largely unnoticed by mainstream psychologists who currently focus on the replication crisis, which they aim to solve by scrutinizing the epistemological foundations of significance testing, confidence interval estimations and Bayesian approaches (Nosek et al, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Wagenmakers et al, 2016; Zwaan et al, 2017)—thus, by improving issues of data analysis .…”

Quantification in Experimental Psychology and Pragmatic Epistemology: Tension Between the Scientific Imperative and the Social Imperative

“…In consequence, a protocol for validating measurement specific to the field of psychology is therefore needed, breaking with the formal framework of measurement in physics. Such a protocol to validate a measurement in psychology appears to be operational if it is considered as a pragmatic approach ( Sherry, 2011 ; Mari et al, 2012 ; Guyon et al, 2018 ; Maul et al, 2018 ).…”