Measurement-Based Analysis of System Dependability Using Fault Injection and Field Failure Data

Abstract

Abstract. The discussion in this paper focuses on the issues involved in analyzing the availability of networked systems using fault injection and the failure data collected by the logging mechanisms built into the system. In particular we address: (1) analysis in the prototype phase using physical fault injection to an actual system. We use example of fault injection-based evaluation of a software-implemented fault tolerance (SIFT) environment (built around a set of self-checking processes called ARMORS) that provides error detection and recovery services to spaceborne scientific applications and (2) measurement-based analysis of systems in the field. We use example of LAN of Windows NT based computers to present methods for collecting and analyzing failure data to characterize network system dependability. Both, fault injection and failure data analysis enable us to study naturally occurring errors and to provide feedback to system designers on potential availability bottlenecks. For example, the study of failures in a network of Windows NT machines reveals that most of the problems that lead to reboots are software related and that though the average availability evaluates to over 99%, a typical machine, on average, provides acceptable service only about 92% of the time.