Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity

Sultanescu, Olivia

doi:10.1111/papq.12339

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…If she goes this route, the attitude is more like a performative act in instituting the act as correct, as creating new reality (compare Brandom's phenomenalism about norms in 1994: 33‐49; for discussion of both ways of reading her see Haddock, 2012, pp. 167‐168, Sultanescu, 2021).…”

Section: Ginsborg's Combination Of Dispositionalism With a Primitive ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles

Reiland

2024

Philosophy Compass

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Abstract“Rule‐following” is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule‐following with emphasis on Kripke's skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two‐part contribution was devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II is about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian's and Wright's new puzzles.

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Section: Ginsborg's Combination Of Dispositionalism With a Primitive ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Or consider the opposite case. I see what I take to be a table yet respond with ‘artwork’ in order to deceive someone, but the thing really is, unbeknownst to me, an artwork, so I did not make a mistake (Sultanescu, 2021, pp. 366‐367).…”

Section: Ginsborg's Combination Of Dispositionalism With a Primitive ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles

Reiland

2024

Philosophy Compass

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Rules and Rule-Following

Miller

2024

Reference Module in Social Sciences

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Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning

Miller

2024

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Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, this book develops a new, non-reductionist, response to the sceptical argument about meaning famously developed in Saul Kripke’s book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It begins by outlining an intuitive notion of following a rule, explaining its relationship to the notions of linguistic meaning and intentional content. It then gives an outline and development of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, going into detail on the arguments against reductive dispositional accounts of meaning. It also explains Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s objections to non-reductionist views which take semantic and intentional facts to be primitive and sui generis and argues against views – such as error theories and forms of non-factualism – which attempt to respond to the argument by conceding that there are no meaning facts. The position advocated in the book emerges from a response to recent arguments developed by Paul Boghossian (“The Inference Problem”) and Crispin Wright (“The Minor Premise Problem”) which appear to imply that rule-following and competent language use are impossible even if we assume that Kripke’s challenge has been met. A reply to Boghossian and Wright is then developed via a new account of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the notion of “following a rule blindly” or “blind rule-following” that connects it to the Wittgensteinian idea that there is a way of following a rule that does not involve interpretation. In turn, this is used to generate a response to Kripke: understanding an expression is a matter of having an intention to exercise one’s ability to use it in accord with its meaning or correctness condition.

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Meaning Scepticism and Primitive Normativity

Cited by 10 publications

References 28 publications

Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles

Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles

Rules and Rule-Following

Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Meaning

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