Me, myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on elusiveness of the self

Renaudie, Pierre-Jean

doi:10.1007/s11007-013-9243-3

Cited by 29 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…So we must conclude that the self is as superfluous as was the “transcendental I” in Kant's Critique of pure reason . (2013, 106).If Sartre's distinction is untenable, then he must either accept that self‐consciousness is simply consciousness of a self, that is, of something determinate or real; this defeats his claim that consciousness is not akin to a persisting substance, ego, or I. Alternatively, he must concede that his view of consciousness is vacuous and fails to pick out anything distinctive. If Renaudie is right, then Sartre's account of consciousness is nothing less than incoherent.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind

Apostolopoulos

2023

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I argue that Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego draws on Kant's theory of spontaneity to articulate its metaphysical account of consciousness's mode of being, to defend its phenomenological description of the intentional structure of self‐consciousness, and to diagnose the errors that motivate views of consciousness qua person or substance. In addition to highlighting an overlooked dimension of Sartre's early relation to Kant, this interpretation offers a fresh account of how Sartre's argument for the primacy of pre‐personal consciousness works, and brings the extent of his proximity to idealist models of mind into greater relief. It also affords Sartre the resources to respond to criticisms that his account of self‐consciousness relies on a spurious distinction and that his view of freedom cannot explain how consciousness is conditioned by its world.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So we must conclude that the self is as superfluous as was the “transcendental I” in Kant's Critique of pure reason . (2013, 106).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind

Apostolopoulos

2023

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Significations are open to combining themselves freely, regardless of what the intuitive restrictions are. As a result, the signifying acts refer to purely logic-grammar laws (for instance, language structures) rather than mere intuitions, which sets the possibilities for sense-bearing statements as argued by Renaudie (2013). The intuitive content does not by itself keep any categorial relations, but this content can at most be a function of confirmation for categorial articulation which originated from the pure thought sphere.…”

Section: Components Of Categorial Intuition In Husserlian Investigationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Copula is an intuitive predicate of consciousness on fulfilment of knowing and judging acts

Pala¹

2020

Humanit Soc Sci Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The recent investigations into knowledge and its elements viz facts, skills and objects have become prominent in various subfields of philosophy and other areas like linguistics, cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence. These investigations have been mainly on understanding the relation between the intentionality and its referential entities to know how they enrich knowledge with their existence. This article starts with an exploration of the fundamental aspects of judgemental sense from the knowledge origins perspective. To explain the consequences of this, I start with reconstructing the notion of categorial intuitions described in Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigations by relating it to ‘knowledge origination’ as an intuitive fulfilment of signifying acts. This offers a relation of perceptual synthesis, operating implicitly among the signifying intentions upon grasping intended objects, in view of language structures such as copulas. This leads to the synthesis of intuitive aspects mainly from the categorial elements for a judgemental sense or thinking and the attitude from the very sphere of perception. The tension between categorial intuitions is understood as foundational acts and founded acts. Husserl’s sixth Logical Investigation describes the notion of passive synthesis, the genesis of categoriality in every realm of sensibility that allows one to formulate the relational role among the ‘act of knowing’ and phenomenological approaches to the judgemental sense. Thus, the investigation focuses on perceptual judgements and categories, which fulfils the judgemental sense of categorial elements and attitude.

show abstract

“…We argue that projective geometry accounts for certain puzzling features of consciousness that stem from its perspectival character (e.g., the elusiveness of the point of view, cf., Howell, 2010; Williford, 2010; Williford et al, 2012; Renaudie, 2013) and is essential to the full explanation of its key cognitive-behavioral functions. The concept of 4D projective transformation is central to the model, as it yields an account of the link between perception, imagination, and multi-point-of-view action planning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We summarize our recently introduced Projective Consciousness Model (PCM) (Rudrauf et al., 2017) and relate it to outstanding conceptual issues in the theory of consciousness. The PCM combines a projective geometrical model of the perspectival phenomenological structure of the field of consciousness with a variational Free Energy minimization model of active inference, yielding an account of the cybernetic function of consciousness, viz., the modulation of the field’s cognitive and affective dynamics for the effective control of embodied agents. The geometrical and active inference components are linked via the concept of projective transformation, which is crucial to understanding how conscious organisms integrate perception, emotion, memory, reasoning, and perspectival imagination in order to control behavior, enhance resilience, and optimize preference satisfaction. The PCM makes substantive empirical predictions and fits well into a (neuro)computationalist framework. It also helps us to account for aspects of subjective character that are sometimes ignored or conflated: pre-reflective self-consciousness, the first-person point of view, the sense of minenness or ownership, and social self-consciousness. We argue that the PCM, though still in development, offers us the most complete theory to date of what Thomas Metzinger has called “phenomenal selfhood.”

show abstract

Me, myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on elusiveness of the self

Cited by 29 publications

References 3 publications

Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind

Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind

Copula is an intuitive predicate of consciousness on fulfilment of knowing and judging acts

The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About