May Kantians commit virtual killings that affect no other persons?

Abstract

Are acts of violence performed in virtual environments ever morally wrong, even when no other persons are affected? While some such acts surely reflect deficient moral character, I focus on the moral rightness or wrongness of acts. Typically it's thought that, on Kant's moral theory, an act of virtual violence is morally wrong (i.e., violate the Categorical Imperative) only if the act mistreats another person. But I argue that, on Kant's moral theory, some acts of virtual violence can be morally wrong, even when no other persons or their avatars are affected. First, I explain why many have thought that, in general on Kant's moral theory, virtual acts affecting no other persons or their avatars can't violate the Categorical Imperative. For there are real world acts that clearly do, but it seems that when we consider the same sorts of acts done alone in a virtual environment, they don't violate the Categorical Imperative, because no others persons were involved. But then, how could any virtual acts like these, that affect no other persons or their avatars, violate the Categorical Imperative? I then argue that there indeed can be such cases of morally wrong virtual acts-some due to an actor's having erroneous beliefs about morally relevant facts, and others due not to error, but to the actor's intention leaving out morally relevant facts while immersed in a virtual environment. I conclude by considering some implications of my arguments for both our present technological context as well as the future.

The Grave Resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma: an Argument for a Moral Distinction Between Virtual Murder and Virtual Child Molestation

“…For example, Tilson (2018) argues that virtual/simulated murder is always to some extent wrong "by virtue of constituting a disrespectful act" (p.206) -but deliberately does not extend his argument the mere representation of a wrongdoing. Likewise Flattery (2021) argues that some instances of virtual murder may occur where the player "might employ maxims that would fail to satisfy the Categorical Imperative" -but these instance relate to cases where we "find ourselves mistaking-or being led to mistake-the virtual for the real" (p.10). Alternatively Milne & Ivankovic (2021) provide a potential consequentialist resolution to the gamer's dilemma, arguing that "the taboo against paedophilia not only exists, unlike any taboo against murder, but also seems more easily justifiable on a rule-consequentalist basis" (p.15).…”

“…It is worth noting thatHeinrichs (2020) believes that this type of analogy (between an actual wrongdoing and it's virtual counterpart) "while occasionally resulting in correct results by chance-leads to absurd results when applied across the board" (p.2). 2 AlthoughAli (2015),Nader (2020) andFlattery (2021) all give reason to think that certain instances of virtual murder are always impermissible. AndTilson (2018) provides reason to think all instances of virtual/simulated murder are, to some extent, wrong.3 The 'just a game' defence is also sometime known as the 'magic circle' defence.…”