Maximization of Multi-Round Network Survivability under Considerations of the Defender's Defensive Messaging Strategies

Abstract

nowadays, enterprises face many challenges of cyber security. How to efficiently allocate defensive resources to reduce damages which are caused by cyber attackers and evaluate system survivability to keeping services operating became important issues. Hence, we develop a scenario of that both cyber attacker and network defender are with incompletely understanding the information about each other is considered. We conduct a mathematical model for analyze this problem for the decision makers to resolve these dilemmas. The Average DOD is then applied to evaluate damage degree of network to estimate all possible strategies which both cyber attacker and network defender would take. Moreover, network defender could release message which might be doing nothing at all, truth, secrecy or deception to confuse cyber attacker to achieve better defense efficiency. In the process of problem solving, the "gradient method" and "game theory" would be used to obtain the optimal resource allocation strategies for both cyber attacker and network defender.

A Game Theoretic Software Test-bed for Cyber Security Analysis of Critical Infrastructure

“…A cyber warfare interaction scenario is formulated as a game where the players (cyber attackers and network defenders) are assumed to possess imperfect information about their opponents. With the uncertainty about the current status of the environment, the players have to strategically plan their actions to gain a positive payoff [16][17][18][19] . These attackdefence scenarios are modelled and exercised on a virtual cyber test-bed using modelling and simulation techniques to assess and evaluate the vulnerabilities in cyber systems, suggest various course of actions and support decisions of appropriate actions to be taken by the players.…”