Matters of Mind

Factive Phenomenal Characters*

“…Among the visual perceptual experiences are those which (partially or exhaustively) constitute all episodes of seeing things as they are—the “veridical” experiences. Also included are such episodes of “visually hallucinating” as visual aspects of dreams, hallucinations properly so‐called as those resulting from mescaline, such creatures of philosophical fiction as episodes of visual‐like experiencing induced by vat‐keepers, and the like; and the episodes of “illusion”, cases in which one sees things as they aren't (as when one sees a white card spot‐illuminated with blue light so that it looks blue; for more on the veridical/illusory/hallucinatory distinction, see Sturgeon 2000).…”

“…Veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination seem to place objects and their features directly before the mind. (Sturgeon, 2000, 9)The ripe tomato seems immediately present to me in experience. I am not in any way aware of any cognitive distance between me and the scene in front of me; the fact that what I'm doing is representing the world is clearly not itself part of the experience.…”

“…Veridical perception, illusion, and hallucination seem to place objects and their features directly before the mind. (Sturgeon, 2000, 9)…”

Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance

“…34 This difficulty with Intentionalism is broadly recognized (Chalmers 1996, p. 378, fn. 38;Carruthers 2000;Sturgeon 2000; Jehle and Kriegel forthcoming), though Intentionalists have not done much to dispel it convincingly. 35 Plausibly, ChomskyÕs concern about truth-conditional semantics (Chomsky, 2000) takes something like this form.…”

What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?

“…28 28 Sturgeon (2000) (pp. 96–8) rejects both reliability as high conditional probability and reliability as increase in probability .…”