Material Constitution is Ad Hoc

Smid, Jeroen

doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9818-6

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 37 publications

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“…So the original puzzle remains for Clifford, the real whole. (This is in line with Smid (2017) where it is argued that material constitution provides an ad hoc solution to the problem of coincidence.) 14 For example, with respect to the time travel scenario Eagle (2016, pp.…”

Section: Endurantismsupporting

confidence: 82%

Mereology and time travel

Proietti

Smid

2019

Philos Stud

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Core principles of mereology have been questioned by appealing to time travel scenarios. This paper questions the methodology of employing time travel scenarios to argue against mereology. We show some time travel scenarios are structurally equivalent to more standard ones not involving time travel; and that the three main theories about persistence through time (i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and stage theory) can each solve both the time travel scenario as well as the structurally similar classical scenario. Time travel scenarios that are not similar to more standard arguments are instead problematic because they are open to different, incompatible interpretations. We conclude that compared to the classical arguments against mereological principles, time travel scenarios do not add anything new.

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Section: Endurantismsupporting

confidence: 82%

Mereology and time travel

Proietti

Smid

2019

Philos Stud

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Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms

Giordani

Calosi

2023

Philos Stud

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Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts without proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization depends on how the notions of sum and composition are defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that: (i) is not equivalent to existing definitions in the literature, if no strong decomposition principle is assumed; (ii) can be used to argue that the standard characterization of atomism fails, because having atomic parts is not sufficient to be a sum of atoms; and (iii) provides a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes, contributing to the ongoing debate on this crucial topic.

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Extensionality for fusions and pluralities

Smid

2018

Synthese

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One of the more persistent debates in mereology is whether distinct wholes can have the same parts. Extensional mereologists hold that if there is no part that makes the difference, then there is nothing to distinguish the wholes, so sameness of parts implies identity. Non-extensionalists, however, do think there are cases where distinct wholes share all their parts. This paper argues that the kind of argument non-extensionalists employ can also be levelled against a widely accepted extensionality principle of plural logic. Non-extensionalists thus face a dilemma: either give up the argument for nonextensional mereology, or deny both the extensionality principle of mereology and the analogous principle for plural logic.

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Material Constitution is Ad Hoc

Cited by 3 publications

References 37 publications

Mereology and time travel

Mereology and time travel

Atoms, combs, syllables and organisms

Extensionality for fusions and pluralities

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