Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem

Olson, Eric T.

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00233

Cited by 89 publications

(53 citation statements)

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“…If a defense of Minimalism requires a criticism of the Twoist's metaphysics (even on a very general basis), then Minimalism is bound to draw on philosophical resources and positions at 17 This example, of the sort levied by Baker (1997), is discussed in Olson (2001). 18 The Indiscernibility Problem, as I have presented it here, is by no means an Oneist clincher.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Those objects would simply have to belong to the same kind and have the same identity-conditions and other qualitative properties." (Olson (2001), p. 340) For two, much more would need to be said about the histories of objects and other allied objections.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4.5, for a discussion of coincident objects and de re modality. 15 The defense I have in mind, sometimes referred to as the 'Indiscernibility Problem', receives an excellent and more extensive discussion in Olson (2001). I follow him on many of the details.…”

Section: Prospects For a Minimalist Defense Of Minimalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Slater

2005

Dialectica

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Achille Varzi [2000] has suggested a nice response to the familiar argument purporting to establish the existence of perfectly coinciding objects -objects which, if they existed, would trouble mereological extensionality and the "Minimalist View" of ontology. The trick is to defend Minimalism without tarnishing its status as a meta-principle: that is, without making any firstorder ontological claims. Varzi's response, though seeming to allow for a comfortable indifference about metaphysical matters peripheral to Minimalism, is not general enough to stave off attacks on extensionality from more sophisticated corners. However, Varzi's argument bears a kinship with a more general argument against coincident objects. I consider how such an argument sits with the meta-doctrinal status of Minimalism.The Cat and the Catstuff I want you to consider first off, without preface or context, two questions: (I) Can a cat survive the loss of its tail? and (II) Can a certain quantity of stuff survive the loss of any of its parts? A natural answer -one that accords with so-called "ordinary intuitions" -calls for mereological essentialism regarding quantities of stuff but denies that doctrine when it comes to cats. Such a stance, however, leaves the door open to a well-known argument for the existence of perfectly coinciding objects, the existence of which runs contrary to other ordinary intuitions. 1Cast the argument like so: Let 'Tibbles' name a certain cat and 'Tib+Tail' name the mereological sum of Tibbles' body and her tail -or if you like, the quantity of "catstuff " or collection of simples, out of which Tibbles is made. According to our natural stance: (1) Tibbles can survive loss of its tail, (2) Tib+Tail cannot survive loss of its tail. But then there is a property which Tibbles has and Tib+Tail lacks: Tibbles, but not Tib+Tail can survive loss of a tail. So they must be distinct. If the argument is sound, Vol. 57, N o 3 (2003), pp. 323-329 † Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York; Email: matthew.slater@ columbia.edu 1 The questions of whether this stance is natural or whether there is at bottom any sense to such a compliment are quite beside the point here. I mean to use "natural" only as a convenient label. The important question is how this stance troubles mereological extensionality. Dialectica

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Slater

2005

Dialectica

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“…(DP) Given a true sentence, one cannot establish whether the sentence obtained by substituting in it one designator "x" with another designator "y" (in a 27 Hence comes also one of the positive arguments for identity the unifier can advance: the one based upon the so-called modal supervenience thesis (to be found in various forms, for instance, in Jubien 1993, Levey 1997, Sider 1999, and Olson 2001. We have seen that our multiplier is trying to ground differences in the actual world on modal intuitions.…”

Section: Question-begging Predicates and The Discernibility Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: an Issue in Meta-Ontology

Berto

2012

Int Ontology Metaphysics

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Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F() made true by a and false by b. Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic. Some philosophers think that the variety of the world we talk about depends on the variety of the linguistic expressions we use; some believe that the world itself is variegated. This paper deals with (bits of) this issue: where should we draw the line between features of the world and features of the language we use to talk about the world? I shall approach it by considering a philosophical dispute concerning the composition of material objects. I will begin with a single argument, but broader ontological and, more importantly, meta-ontological issues will quickly enter the stage.

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“…44 The grounding problem is discussed by many authors. See Bennett (2004b) for a useful discussion, and Olson (2001) for a vigorous development of the objection.…”

Section: Getting Priority Straight 85mentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting priority straight

deRosset

2010

Philos Stud

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Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem

Cited by 89 publications

References 15 publications

Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Minimalism and Coincidence: Comments on Varzi

Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: an Issue in Meta-Ontology

Getting priority straight

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