Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy

Sönmez, Tayfun; Switzer, Tobias B.

doi:10.3982/ecta10570

Cited by 144 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Other twosided matching systems include the allocation of residents to hospitals (Roth 1984) and cadets to army branches (Sönmez and Switzer 2013). We argue that insights from matching theory can play a crucial part in the global refugee resettlement process.…”

Section: Matching In Theory and In Practicementioning

confidence: 97%

“…In the private sponsorship scheme, the private organizations already have the ability to name particular refugees so there is no scope for matching with preferences. 6 Since refugees could in principle express a preference over whether they enter the resettlement process via the GA or the BVOR programs, we can describe this matching problem as one of matching with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005;Sönmez and Switzer 2013). Hence, a refugee family might reasonably prefer to be resettled in Toronto by the Lutheran Church to being resettled in Vancouver by the government.…”

Section: Canadamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Matching Systems for Refugees

Jones¹,

Teytelboym²

2017

JMHS

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Executive Summary 1Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the European Union and examine how refugee matching might work within the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States.

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Section: Matching In Theory and In Practicementioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Canadamentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Systems for Refugees

Jones¹,

Teytelboym²

2017

JMHS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…School choice is just one of many settings that matching theorists have studied. Other twosided matching systems include the allocation of residents to hospitals (Roth 1984) and cadets to army branches (Sönmez and Switzer 2013). We argue that insights from matching theory can play a crucial part in the global refugee resettlement process.…”

Section: Matching In Theory and In Practicementioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Canadamentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching Systems for Refugees

Jones

Teytelboym

2017

Journal on Migration and Human Security

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Design of matching systems between refugees and states or local areas is emerging as one of the most promising solutions to problems in refugee resettlement. We describe the basics of two-sided matching theory used in a number of allocation problems, such as school choice, where both sides need to agree to the match. We then explain how these insights can be applied to international refugee matching in the context of the European Union and examine how refugee matching might work within the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Public attention and activism often focuses on the question of "how many?" In the context of incredibly limited supply of resettlement spaces, this is not unreasonable. The proportion of refugees in situations of "protracted displacement" (where more than 25,000 refugees have been in exile for more than five years) was estimated at two-thirds in 2009 (Loescher, Gil, and Milner 2009), prior to the current Syrian crisis. For refugees in protracted situations, the average length of stay is 17 years. There are now some 21.3 million refugees in the world, out of some 65.3 million forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR 2016a). In this context, global resettlement capacity is awesomely, ludicrously inadequate: in 2015, states admitted 107,100 refugees for resettlement, of which the United States accepted more than half (66,500) (UNHCR 2016b, 3). As one recent group of refugee experts uncompromisingly put it, "the current global system for refugee protection is broken" (Dauvergne and Hathaway 2016). However, as with any scarce resource, it is also vital to consider how the limited resettlement capacity of the states can be used most effectively. In this paper, we focus on the question that arises after it has been decided that a given group of refugees will be resettled. Instead

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“…Recently, Lepird (2016) proposed further research to adapt algorithmic approaches for identifying air force personnel assignments, using either an LP formulation or the SMA. Within the U.S. Army, Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used an agent-based model with an officer-optimal stable solution, wherein side contracts could be chosen to receive a first choice assignment. Although the authors primarily investigated the matching-with-contracts paradigm, the underlying model for their agents used a deferred acceptance algorithm.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A scenario-based parametric analysis of the army personnel-to-assignment matching problem

Ferguson

Hill

Lunday

2020

JDAL

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Purpose This study aims to compare linear programming and stable marriage approaches to the personnel assignment problem under conditions of uncertainty. Robust solutions should exhibit reduced variability of solutions in the presence of one or more additional constraints or problem perturbations added to some baseline problems. Design/methodology/approach Several variations of each approach are compared with respect to solution speed, solution quality as measured by officer-to-assignment preferences and solution robustness as measured by the number of assignment changes required after inducing a set of representative perturbations or constraints to an assignment instance. These side constraints represent the realistic assignment categorical priorities and limitations encountered by army assignment managers who solve this problem semiannually, and thus the synthetic instances considered herein emulate typical problem instances. Findings The results provide insight regarding the trade-offs between traditional optimization and heuristic-based solution approaches. Originality/value The results indicate the viability of using the stable marriage algorithm for talent management via the talent marketplace currently used by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force for personnel assignments.

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Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy

Cited by 144 publications

References 45 publications

Matching Systems for Refugees

Matching Systems for Refugees

Matching Systems for Refugees

A scenario-based parametric analysis of the army personnel-to-assignment matching problem

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