Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

Polanski, Arnold

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0935-y

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Furthermore, the need for forecast-based on matching probabilities-arose in decision-making. This is how matching, bargaining on networks and randomness led to exchange networks ( [20]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching

Dragicevic

2022

Games

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This paper tries to prove that the outcomes stemming from interactions on assignment markets bring about coordination in case of a stochastic matching subject to various forms of expectations. We consider an exchange network with stochastic matching between the pairs of players and analyze the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. The cases of convergent expectations, divergent expectations and of social preferences are studied. The extension of earlier works lies in the consideration of a stochastic matching on a graph dependent on the weights of edges. The results show that, in all three cases, the dynamics converges rapidly to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, which is an equilibrium that combines notions of stability and fairness. In the first two scenarios, the numerical simulations reveal that the convergence toward a fixed point is speedily achieved at the value of the outside option. In the third scenario, the fixed point promptly converges to the value of the outside option supplemented by the surplus share.

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“…Furthermore, the need for forecast-based on matching probabilities-arose in decision-making. This is how matching, bargaining on networks and randomness led to exchange networks ( [20]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching

Dragicevic

2022

Games

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“… Polanski () emphasizes this point in a range of bargaining environments, including the cooperative game of Kleinberg and Tardos () and the stationary market of Manea () in addition to the models already mentioned. …”

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confidence: 99%

Efficient partnership formation in networks

Bloch

Dutta²,

Manea

2019

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We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players essential for realizing every maximum matching can avoid this risk and enjoy higher payoffs than inessential players. Although the search for partners is decentralized and reflects local partnership opportunities, the strength of essential players drives efficient partnership formation in every network. Equilibrium behavior is determined by the classification of nodes in the Gallai–Edmonds decomposition of the underlying network.

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Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

Cited by 2 publications

References 25 publications

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching

Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching

Efficient partnership formation in networks

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