Mastering the Guilds’ Debts in Eighteenth-Century Paris

Abstract

T h eF r e n c hg u i l d s ,l i k ea l lt h ec o r p o r a t eb o d i e s ,w e r ea s k e dt oc o n t r i b u t e t ot h eK i n g ' s n a n c e s .T h i sp a p e rl o o k sa tt h ew o r ko far o y a lc o m m i s s i o n-t h e Commission pour la révision des comptes des communautés d'arts et métiers-which w a ss e tu pi n1 7 1 6t oe x a m i n et h e n a n c i a ls i t u a t i o no ft h eg u i l d s .T h ec o m m i s s i o n u s e di t sp o w e rt oc l o s e l ym o ni t o ran dim p o s ean um b e ro fc o n s t r ain t so nth ew a y sin whichtheguildsmanagedtheirre v enue ,e xpenditureanddeb t.Controlb ythestateof th eguil ds ' n an ce sw asu sedtof acili ta teth epo li ti c alin t e gra ti o no fguil dsin toro y al administration. In this respect, the development of the king's debts made it possible for themonarchytotakecontrolofitscorporatebodieswhich,initially ,hadonlyconsented toactasintermediariestosupporttheking' scredit.

Economic Theory, Reformism, and the Emergence of Economic Rights: Models of Identification and Dissociation in the European Corporations of Trades During the “Long” Eighteenth Century

“…The intertwining of the guild's privileged design with the government's financial scheme highlighted the specificity of the French case and the difficulties that policymakers faced in implementing a reform policy stricto sensu. Any serious attempt to reform the corporate system immediately encountered the problem of debt and the State's interest in maintaining secure tax revenues through a more substantial intervention and control (Marraud 2015). In other words, "la réforme ne fut jamais une véritable alternative à la Révolution" (Bien 1988, p. 402).…”