Mass and Elite Political Outlooks in Post-Soviet Russia: How Congruent?

Reisinger, William M.; Melville, Andrei; Miller, Arthur H.; Hesli, Vicki L

doi:10.2307/449042

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The instrumental support cluster includes eight items 6. Rather than matching each member of political elites with his or her constituents, Reisinger (1995, 1997) and Reisinger et al (1996) also made a comparison of the entire set of elites and the entire set of ordinary citizens of the same ''geographical location of their residence'' when they studied belief congruence or/and constraint in postSoviet societies. However, it should be noted that, unlike the elites in most previous studies (e.g., Converse and Pierce 1986;Jennings 1992;Reisinger 1995, 1997), who tend to have higher positions and come from larger geographical bases (national or regional), the CCP cadres in our study are local political elites who do not have direct influence on public affairs at national level and yet have more frequent contacts with their constituents.…”

Section: Data and Clusters Of Subjective Orientationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When comparing elite and mass belief systems, Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1995) and Reisinger et al (1996) also included administrators in the category of the elite. 5.…”

Section: Data and Clusters Of Subjective Orientationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…least three major concerns that have motivated inquiries into congruence (or similarity) between mass and elite attitudes and constraint (or consistency) of their respective belief systems (e.g., Achen 1978;Converse and Pierce 1986;Dalton 1985;Hermann 1986;Huber and Powell 1994;Jennings 1992;Reisinger, 1995, 1997;Reisinger et al 1996). In relation to congruence, a first concern has been about the quality of representation by the political elites.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban China

Chen¹

1999

Public Opinion Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Comparisons of mass and elite sociopolitical preferences and levels of their attitudinal consistency are critical for understanding mass-elite interaction and hence political development in such a rapidly changing society as China. Yet such studies are very scarce for urban China. Based on the responses to identical questions asked of both mass and elite interviewees in Beijing, this article submits four important findings. First, while the masses and elites shared similar views on government policy performance and the role of the individual in politics, they held quite different positions on issues of regime legitimacy, reform assessment, and democratic principles. Second, these two sets of political actors organized their subjective orientations to some issues similarly but to others differently. Third, in general, the elites in this study had low attitudinal consistency relative to their counterparts in many other studies. And, finally, such relatively low attitudinal consistency among the elites seemed to be caused at least in part by the ongoing decay of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) grassroots organizations. These findings have strong implications for the weakness and strength of the CCP's rule and hence China's sociopolitical stability.Do ordinary citizens and political elites in China share similar positions on major sociopolitical issues? Do the two groups construct their respective positions (or subjective orientations) similarly? These questions have a lot to do with explaining the nature and characteristics of the relationship between the two sets of political actors, and hence with predicting sociopolitical development in that rapidly changing society.Among studies of democratic and transitional societies, there are at jie chen is associate professor of political science and director of the Institute of Asian Studies at Old Dominion University.

show abstract

Section: Data and Clusters Of Subjective Orientationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When comparing elite and mass belief systems, Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1995) and Reisinger et al (1996) also included administrators in the category of the elite. 5.…”

Section: Data and Clusters Of Subjective Orientationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban China

Chen¹

1999

Public Opinion Quarterly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Fatores como regime político, sistema partidário, organização da estrutura administrativa influenciam na concepção de elite política, especialmente quando os estudos se voltaram para democracias consolidadas (Putnam et al, 1979;Ruostetssaari, 1993;Steen, 1997;Adms et al, 2012), inclusive na renovação geracional (Dalton, 1987). Tais fatores se refletem também nos estudos que analisam as elites nas experiências de democracias recentes (Kullberg, 1994;Case, 1994;Reissinger et al, 1996), ou ainda para aperfeiçoamento das antigas ou mais consolidadas, porém sob a perspectiva de resgate de elementos presentes nos estudos clássicos (Uriarte, 1997).…”

Section: Abordagens Contemporâneasunclassified

Sobre elite política (Paper 350)

Mathis¹,

Filho²

2015

PAPERSNAEA

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Este ensaio faz uma revisão da literatura sobre elites políticas, a partir da produção científica nas ciências sociais. Tem como objetivos a) descrever a origem e evolução das correntes teóricometodológicas sobre elites políticas e b) identificar a concepção de elites, os métodos e as tendências dos estudos empíricos. A seleção das obras foi feita a partir de duas características da cienciometria. As obras analisadas foram selecionadas em duas bases de textos nacionais e quatro internacionais e em bibliotecas físicas, utilizando como palavras-chave “elite política” no singular e plural em três idiomas. Os resultados indicam a presença de sucessivos debates metodológicos desde sua origem até a atualidade, e que o volume e a diversidade dos estudos empíricos em regimes democráticos emergentes vêm ganhando destaque, aliado a novos fundamentos metodológicos, o que não vem acontecendo no Brasil. Conclui que muitas questões ainda estão abertas para os estudos sobre o tema e que a controvérsia contribuiu para o desenvolvimento dos estudos, motivada por uma indefinição conceitual e pluralidade metodológica.Palavras-Chave: Elite Política. Clássicos. Métodos. Pluralismo. Elitismo.

show abstract

“…Do the views and attitudes of Russian citizens regarding sensitive political issues, such as security policies, align well with the findings accumulated in the comparative and American politics literature about the impact of age on public opinion toward domestic policies? Much attention of scholars and policy makers has been focused on the postcommunist development and change of both elite and mass attitudes in the former Soviet Union (USSR), yielding a significant body of theoretical and empirical scholarship on the conditions and determinants of political and social attitudes across varying strata and groups, and their possible effects and implications for the ongoing transition from state communism (Bahry ; Bahry et al ; Gibson , , ; Gibson and Duch ; Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger , ; Reisinger et al , ; Zimmerman ). Even though social scientific research is becoming increasingly difficult in a number of postcommunist areas, including perhaps most notably Russia (Goode ), the ability to use survey techniques to study the attitudes of the vast and diverse peoples of the former USSR has been among the most significant developments in social science in decades.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Socialization, Rationality, and Age: Generational Gaps and the Attitudes toward the Chechen War in Russia

Shaykhutdinov

2019

Politics & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, I focus on the factor of age as a determinant of individual support for the use of force by the government. I argue that socialization theory, as a key conceptual frame, should be supplemented by rational choice explanations for understanding individual preferences more fully. Employing survey data on the Chechen conflict, I investigate generational gaps in Russia regarding the government's use of force, and the form those gaps take. Empirically, I substantiate a theoretical claim that several generations exist in Russia, each with its own attitudes and beliefs, including the so‐called “second edition of the Decembrists,” “the people of the ‘60s,” “the people of the ‘70s,” “the generation of perestroika,” “the disappointed generation,” and a “lost generation/mega‐consumers.” I find strong, albeit surprising, evidence of a generational gap in Russia, with respondents born in different time periods, especially “the ‘60s people” and “mega‐consumers” expressing variable attitudes toward the Chechnya conflict. Related Articles Brader, Ted A., and Joshua A. Tucker. 2009. “What's Left Behind When the Party's Over: Survey Experiments on the Effects of Partisan Cues in Putin's Russia.” Politics & Policy 37 (4): 843‐868. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00201.x Smyth, Regina. 2014. “The Putin Factor: Personalism, Protest, and Regime Stability in Russia.” Politics & Policy 42 (4): 567‐592. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12080 Stegmaier, Mary A., and Gwyn Erb. 2008. “Gender and Generation Gaps in Russian Economic Values during the Yeltsin Years.” Politics & Policy 33 (3): 416‐443. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2005.tb00802.x

show abstract

Mass and Elite Political Outlooks in Post-Soviet Russia: How Congruent?

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban China

Comparing Mass and Elite Subjective Orientations in Urban China

Sobre elite política (Paper 350)

Socialization, Rationality, and Age: Generational Gaps and the Attitudes toward the Chechen War in Russia

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About