for their incisive suggestions. We thank Dick Scott for his encouragement and for inspiring the "streets to suites" title.
FROM STREETS TO SUITES: HOW THE ANTI-BIOTECH MOVEMENT AFFECTED GERMAN PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS ABSTRACTHow do social movements affect decisions within corporations, such as the commercialization of new technologies? We suggest that the effect of movement activism is conditioned by the internal polity and therefore varies across organizations. This article examines how the anti-genetic movement in Germany during the 1980s affected six domestic pharmaceutical firms' commercialization of biotechnology. We develop a process model of how movements penetrate the relatively closed polity of private organizations. External contestation weakened the position of internal champions of biotechnology, precipitated divisions among organizational elites, and undermined collective commitment to the technology. The movement also increased perceptions of investment uncertainty, but the consequences of this uncertainty depended on organizational logics of decision making. As a result, investments in some firms were tilted away from domestic biotechnology projects. The model also explains this variation in organization-level outcomes of movement contestation.
FROM STREETS TO SUITES: HOW THE ANTI-BIOTECH MOVEMENT AFFECTED GERMAN PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMSIn the 1970s, the German pharmaceutical industry was known as the pharmacy to the world, and its leading companies were among the first to explore commercial applications of genetic engineering in the 1970s and early 1980s. Both Social Democratic and Christian Democratic governments supported biotechnology by creating national research laboratories and subsidizing university research. Leading pharmaceutical companies, such as Hoechst and Boehringer Mannheim, began in-house research on commercial applications of biotechnology in the late 1970s and collaborated with advanced research centers in the United States, such as Massachusetts GeneralHospital. In the early 1980s, German firms and researchers applied for more biotechnology patents per capita than their U.S. counterparts.1 Due to the absence of venture capital, no entrepreneurial biotechnology sector existed in Germany until the late 1990s, so existing pharmaceutical firms were critical for driving innovation.By the early 1990s, however, this surge by pharmaceutical firms faltered.2 While a few smaller firms had some success with commercializing biotechnology, some of the largest, profitable, and politically powerful corporations struggled. Production plants were sitting idle (e.g., Hoechst's $37 million facility in Frankfurt), delayed (e.g., Bayer's plant to make genetically engineered protein for hemophiliacs in Wuppertal), or shifted abroad (e.g., to Japan, the United States, and France in the case of Bayer and Hoechst). Worse, they largely failed to commercialize their knowledge in the form of biotechnology-based products. Why were these firms unable to produce and develop biotechnological products in Germany? How...