Market instruments, ecosystem services, and property rights: Assumptions and conditions for sustained social and ecological benefits

Lockie, Stewart

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.08.010

Cited by 116 publications

(84 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…There is then debate as to whether corporate CSR represents self-interest by other means or a 57 genuine attempt to redistribute the benefits of the activity to a wider population (Crifo and Forget,58 2015; Schmitz and Schrader, 2015). Given its wider responsibility, more formal establishment, statutory basis and longer term 1 commitment, the NPA comes closest to our ideal model of an SRC.…”

Section: 27mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…45 46 Beyond the question of scale, there is the need to establish an effective governance structure and the principles of adaptive governance and those of good governance. Market based instruments 6 7 have potential roles, but they are incomplete and their outcomes uncertain (Lockie, 2013). We also 8 recognise that the required institutional arrangements will not simply reveal an existing set of 9 shared values and preferences but rather they must be deliberative, acting to create these values.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Governance structures for social-ecological systems: Assessing institutional options against a social residual claimant

Dwyer

Hodge

2016

Environmental Science & Policy

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Rural areas face increasing pressures to deliver both private and public goods from land management. Multiple stakeholders seek different outcomes; and there is substantial heterogeneity in values. Trade-offs, synergies and complementarities exist between different services and alternative bundles of goods. The resulting complex socialecological systems (SES) therefore require adaptive co-management. In a governance context, no single organisation has oversight across the variety of interests involved, but the challenge remains as to how these interests can best be balanced and negotiated, to deliver socially beneficial outcomes. This paper analyses how this might be achieved by considering the perspective of a 'social residual claimant' (SRC). The SRC, as an ideal type, represents the ultimate 'owner' or steward of an ecosystem which sets the criteria to assess alternative outcomes, identifying best approaches and promoting resilience through adaptive management. A SRC cannot be a static construct, but must interact with and influence private land-holders and other stakeholders, adjusting actions as circumstances change. We identify the criteria that would be required in order for an SRC to act in the best interests of society. We then make a comparison of these criteria against the conditions applying in three contrasting approaches currently operating in the UK: National Parks Landscape Partnerships and Nature Improvement Areas. This enables us to identify the differences between approaches and to suggest changes that could enhance capabilities, as well as ideas for further research. We suggest that the ideal of an SRC offers a simple method of benchmarking that has potential application across a wider range of different local contexts, beyond the UK.Response to Reviewers: Reviewer #1 1. … Thus, my major suggestion would be to clarify what they mean. And I think what they mean with the SRC is likely quite close to the idea of a bridging organization (or network administrative organizations, a policy platform, boundary organization, etc). Thus, either stick to one (or several) of these more established concepts, or more clearly explain how the SRC relate to these (and what makes it different). Response:We have substantially reworked the paper in order to explain more clearly the position of the SRC and why it is different from these other types of organisation.2. The really interesting research questions, as I see it, it to try to figure out if and how governance, as an inclusive approach to government, can succeed it that. To move beyond simple assertions of the value of governance to more critically examine how to make governance arrangement effective. That research agenda includes focusing on different 'venues' for co-management (or collaborations) -such as the studied three cases in this paper. Thus, I find the assessment of the seven criteria for these organization useful and interesting (although, again, I would not expect that any one actor would and should fulfill all of them). And worth publ...

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Section: 27mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Governance structures for social-ecological systems: Assessing institutional options against a social residual claimant

Dwyer

Hodge

2016

Environmental Science & Policy

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“…While payment for provisions of public goods like biodiversity has become commonplace, determining which actions deserve payment is not straightforward. Such payments can 'crowd out' intrinsic motivations, and even restrict landholder conservation behaviors to those eligible for payment and only for the duration of those payments (Lockie, 2013;Vatn, 2010). In the case of the Midlands, landholders have come to expect financial assistance for conservation activities that they may have otherwise seen as their responsibility.…”

Section: Diagnosing Fit: Diagnosing Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such issues are common for countries like Australia where the use of neo--liberal market--based approaches to solve conservation problems has become a default policy option, even when such instruments may not fit their intended purpose (Higgins et al, 2014;Lockie, 2013). In the Midlands, payment for conservation was frequently discussed as a panacea for resolving conflicts between private land and public good, yet there is no clear answer to which actions primarily benefit the public good and should be compensated, and which are better left to alternative options such as regulation (Lockie, 2013), or part of a basic albeit poorly defined duty of care (Earl, Curtis, & Allan, 2010). Deferring to compensation options can also undermine legitimacy, suggesting governments may be incapable of enforcing existing regulations (Lockie, 2013).…”

Section: Diagnosing Fit: Diagnosing Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the Midlands, payment for conservation was frequently discussed as a panacea for resolving conflicts between private land and public good, yet there is no clear answer to which actions primarily benefit the public good and should be compensated, and which are better left to alternative options such as regulation (Lockie, 2013), or part of a basic albeit poorly defined duty of care (Earl, Curtis, & Allan, 2010). Deferring to compensation options can also undermine legitimacy, suggesting governments may be incapable of enforcing existing regulations (Lockie, 2013). Many interviewees did indeed think this was the case, expressing concerns about the relative weakness of governments compared with property rights, even if they did not think regulation should be the dominant solution.…”

Section: Diagnosing Fit: Diagnosing Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fit-for-Purpose Institutions? An Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation in the Agricultural Landscape of the Tasmanian Midlands, Australia

Clément

Moore

Lockwood

et al. 2016

Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning

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Biodiversity loss is a globally significant problem. Institutional failure to halt this loss suggests current arrangements are not fit for the purpose of conserving biodiversity. The objective of this paper is to diagnose institutional fitness for conserving biodiversity in the Tasmanian Midlands of Australia, a 2 highly modified agricultural landscape with critically endangered biodiversity values. This paper presents and applies a novel diagnostic framework that adopts a broad view of institutional fit, drawing on concepts from adaptive governance, institutional theory, and public administration, and finds four areas of poor fit that can guide reform efforts. The first is a narrow framing of biodiversity objectives, leading to neglect of key social and ecological concerns. Second, the interplay of current arrangements fails to buffer key economic and political drivers, and compromises adaptive capacity. Third, limited government authority and embedded power relations raise questions about the effectiveness and fairness of current approaches. Finally, the reluctance of governments to devolve authority and decision--making powers to self--organizing networks constrains adaptation. This suite of fit problems constrains achievement of biodiversity conservation, particularly in dealing with landscape multifunctionality, the need to balance private landholder rights and responsibilities, and the need to consider how to respond to emerging novel and hybrid ecosystems.

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Payments for Environmental Services: Revisiting the Theoretical Baseline Assumptions

Aerni

2016

CSR, Sustainability, Ethics &Amp; Governance

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Market instruments, ecosystem services, and property rights: Assumptions and conditions for sustained social and ecological benefits

Cited by 116 publications

References 40 publications

Governance structures for social-ecological systems: Assessing institutional options against a social residual claimant

Governance structures for social-ecological systems: Assessing institutional options against a social residual claimant

Fit-for-Purpose Institutions? An Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation in the Agricultural Landscape of the Tasmanian Midlands, Australia

Payments for Environmental Services: Revisiting the Theoretical Baseline Assumptions

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