2019
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-019-09464-2
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Market enforcement under different legal regimes: a comparison of France and Canada

Abstract: Building upon institutional theory, this study investigates whether and how market enforcement mediates the relationship between external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) corporate governance mechanisms. We focus on two countries with contrasting legal, regulatory and institutional regimes: Canada and France. Market enforcement is proxied by two measures of market efficiency: abnormal returns and price volatility. Our results suggest that external governance mechanisms interact with internal governanc… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 41 publications
(62 reference statements)
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“…Finally, some prior research suggests that there seems to be greater market enforcement in Canada than in France (Cormier et al , 2020), with institutional investors playing a much larger role, especially in terms of demands for disclosure. The analyst community is another key constituency that underlies demand for non-GAAP information.…”
Section: Background and Research Propositionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, some prior research suggests that there seems to be greater market enforcement in Canada than in France (Cormier et al , 2020), with institutional investors playing a much larger role, especially in terms of demands for disclosure. The analyst community is another key constituency that underlies demand for non-GAAP information.…”
Section: Background and Research Propositionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The components of the Bloomberg disclosure score have been found to represent different aspects of a firm (Tamimi & Sebastianelli, 2017). This has led to a number of studies using the individual components (Han et al, 2016;Li et al, 2018;Nollet et al, 2016;Taylor et al, 2018;Wang & Sarkis, 2017), including just the governance component (Buallay, 2018;Chauhan & Kumar, 2018;Cormier et al, 2017;Giannarakis et al, 2018;Katarachia et al, 2018;Khan, 2019;Wang & Sarkis, 2017), which has been found to have the highest level of transparency (Tamimi & Sebastianelli, 2017). Consistent with previous literature, we split the Bloomberg disclosure score into its component parts (Baldini et al, 2018;Giannarakis, 2014;Lo & Kwan, 2017;Tarmuji et al, 2016;Yu et al, 2018).…”
Section: Dependent Variable (Corporate Governance Transparency)mentioning
confidence: 65%
“…We believe it is worthwhile to include France and Germany, two code law European countries that show differences in market enforcement compared to Canada and the UK, two common law countries (e.g. Cormier et al. , 2020).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%