Abstract:Recent years have seen widespread experimentation with market-based instruments (MBIs) for the provision of environmental goods and ecosystem services. However, little attention has been paid to their design or to the effects of the underlying promarket narrative on environmental policy instruments. The purpose of this article is to analyze the emergence and dissemination of the term ''market-based instruments'' applied to the provision of environmental services and to assess to what extent the instruments ass… Show more
“…In this perspective, the main problems highlighted are decision-makers' failure to take biodiversity losses into account in economic calculations, and the lack of policy tools encouraging the internalization of negative externalities resulting from biodiversity losses [19]. Following the finding that traditional approaches failed in meeting the expected conservation outcomes, economic incentives have increasingly been used by policy-makers over recent decades to address environmental concerns [2]. Incentive approach aims to encourage economic decision-makers to adopt good environmental practices by offering compensation or rewards to individuals in exchange for environmental services [12].…”
Section: Economic Foundations and Rationales For The Bo Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Seen as a way to provide economic incentives, the concept of biodiversity offsetting (henceforth BO) has recently enjoyed renewed political interest, and is endorsed in many political agendas [2]. Whilst BO requirements have been appearing in the environmental regulations of many countries since the 1970s (but rarely implemented in practice [3]), BO has recently re-emerged in biodiversity strategies across national and international policies as the main innovative tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide [4].…”
Although many countries have included biodiversity offsetting (BO) requirements in their environmental regulations over the past four decades, this mechanism has recently been the object of renewed political interest. Incorporated into the mitigation hierarchy in three steps aimed at avoiding, reducing and offsetting residual impacts on biodiversity arising from development projects, BO is promoted as the way to achieve the political goal of No Net Loss of biodiversity (NNL). The recent success of BO is mainly based on its ability to provide economic incentives for biodiversity conservation. However, the diversity of BO mechanisms (direct offsets, banking mechanism and offsetting funds) and the various institutional frameworks within which they are applied generate substantial confusion about their economic and ecological implications. In this article, we first analyze the rationale for the BO approach from the welfare and ecological economics. We show that both these frameworks support the use of BO to address environmental externalities, but that they differ in how they consider the substitutability issue and levels of sustainability with regard to natural and manufactured capital, and in how they address ecological concerns. We then examine the economic and ecological performance criteria of BO from conceptual and empirical perspectives. We highlight that the three BO mechanisms involve different economic and ecological logics and inherent benefits, but also potential risks in meeting biodiversity conservation targets. We lastly investigate the ecological constraints with respect to the BO
OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 7358 practice, and economic and organizational limitations of the BO system that may impede achievement of NNL goals. We then reveal the existence of a tension between the economic and ecological rationales in conducting BO that requires making choices about the NNL policy objectives. Finally, this article questions the place of BO in conservation policies and discusses the trade-off between political will and ecological opportunities involved in the BO approach.
“…In this perspective, the main problems highlighted are decision-makers' failure to take biodiversity losses into account in economic calculations, and the lack of policy tools encouraging the internalization of negative externalities resulting from biodiversity losses [19]. Following the finding that traditional approaches failed in meeting the expected conservation outcomes, economic incentives have increasingly been used by policy-makers over recent decades to address environmental concerns [2]. Incentive approach aims to encourage economic decision-makers to adopt good environmental practices by offering compensation or rewards to individuals in exchange for environmental services [12].…”
Section: Economic Foundations and Rationales For The Bo Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Seen as a way to provide economic incentives, the concept of biodiversity offsetting (henceforth BO) has recently enjoyed renewed political interest, and is endorsed in many political agendas [2]. Whilst BO requirements have been appearing in the environmental regulations of many countries since the 1970s (but rarely implemented in practice [3]), BO has recently re-emerged in biodiversity strategies across national and international policies as the main innovative tool for biodiversity conservation worldwide [4].…”
Although many countries have included biodiversity offsetting (BO) requirements in their environmental regulations over the past four decades, this mechanism has recently been the object of renewed political interest. Incorporated into the mitigation hierarchy in three steps aimed at avoiding, reducing and offsetting residual impacts on biodiversity arising from development projects, BO is promoted as the way to achieve the political goal of No Net Loss of biodiversity (NNL). The recent success of BO is mainly based on its ability to provide economic incentives for biodiversity conservation. However, the diversity of BO mechanisms (direct offsets, banking mechanism and offsetting funds) and the various institutional frameworks within which they are applied generate substantial confusion about their economic and ecological implications. In this article, we first analyze the rationale for the BO approach from the welfare and ecological economics. We show that both these frameworks support the use of BO to address environmental externalities, but that they differ in how they consider the substitutability issue and levels of sustainability with regard to natural and manufactured capital, and in how they address ecological concerns. We then examine the economic and ecological performance criteria of BO from conceptual and empirical perspectives. We highlight that the three BO mechanisms involve different economic and ecological logics and inherent benefits, but also potential risks in meeting biodiversity conservation targets. We lastly investigate the ecological constraints with respect to the BO
OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 7358 practice, and economic and organizational limitations of the BO system that may impede achievement of NNL goals. We then reveal the existence of a tension between the economic and ecological rationales in conducting BO that requires making choices about the NNL policy objectives. Finally, this article questions the place of BO in conservation policies and discusses the trade-off between political will and ecological opportunities involved in the BO approach.
“…This aims to reduce/support negative/positive environmental externalities by transferring financial resources from downstream water users (beneficiaries) who benefit from clean water quality, to upstream farmers (service providers) who receive compensation by changing their farming practices [21]. Many PES schemes have been established and implemented in developed countries, such as the European Union and the United States, to motivate farmers to change their farming practices [22][23][24][25]. However, such attention on water-related ecosystem service valuation is currently much less in Asia in general and in South Korea in particular.…”
Abstract:In South Korea, the Soyang Lake is an important source of drinking water to the metropolitan areas including Seoul. However, water quality problems in the Soyang Lake have still remained due to chemical contaminations attributed to conventional farming practices in the upstream areas. Based on a downstream consumer survey using a contingent valuation method, this study estimated the expected willingness to pays (WTPs) for water quality improvement through the conversion to environmentally friendly farming (EFF). The results showed that the estimated annual mean WTP is KRW 36,115 per household. The aggregated WTPs of downstream respondents in the Soyang Lake are sufficient to compensate for the income losses of upstream EFF farmers in highland farming areas. In addition, we found that the downstream citizens who recognize the label for EFF products and who intend to purchase EFF products in the future have a significant impact on WTPs for water quality improvement.
“…Les PSE sont considérés par certains comme des « instruments de marché » (market-based instruments) permettant d'obtenir des résultats environnementaux plus efficients (Bulte et al, 2008). Un tel présupposé est largement remis en cause par les tenants de l'économie écologique institutionnaliste (Boisvert et al, 2013 ;Muradian et al, 2010 ;Muradian et al 2013 ;Vatn, 2010 ;Vatn et al, 2014). Ces derniers démontrent que les PSE ne sont pas des « instruments de marché » à proprement parler, qu'ils correspondent à une diversité d'arrangements institutionnels, et que leur efficacité environnementale et leur efficience économique, le plus souvent controversées, restent à démontrer.…”
International audienceÀ l’aide de l’économie écologique institutionnaliste combinée à l’approche des « moyens de subsistance durables » (MSD) (sustainable livelihoods approach), cet article analyse la capacité des dispositifs de paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE) à réduire la vulnérabilité à la pauvreté des populations locales en comparant deux terrains d’étude : le Costa-Rica (CR) et la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC). Le programme de PSE permet globalement de réduire la vulnérabilité des populations. Toutefois, ses effets sont inégalement répartis au détriment des populations les plus pauvres, marginalisées dans ce dispositif. En RDC, le projet de PSE ne réduit pas actuellement la vulnérabilité des populations locales qui restent pour l’essentiel dans des situations de trappe à pauvreté
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